Buffalo Environmental Law Journal
Volume 9

Number 1

Article 2

10-1-2001

The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes
in the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System
Clifford Fisher
Hanover College

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj
Part of the Environmental Sciences Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in the Current Common
Law Toxic Tort System, 9 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 35 (2001).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj/vol9/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Environmental Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes
in the Current Common Law Toxic Tort System
Clifford Fisher*
Introduction .........................................

37

I. SCIENCE AS LAW .................................
40
A. The Evolving Consensus Concerning the Admission of
Scientific Evidence .............................
41
B. Establishing Evidential Standard: Regulations vs. the
C ourts ........................................
46
C. The Role of Science as Law in the Field of Politics .. 50
1. The Difficulties Encountered when Attempting to
51
Use Science in Law-Making ................
D. The Considerations Involved when Attempting to
Establish an Appropriate Standard of Care ...........
56
E. Establishing Causation and the Difficulties Encountered
when Taking Steps to Make Sure Both Sides Receive Equal
Protection .....................................
58
1. Problems Associated With Scientific Uncertainty
When Attempting to Assign Causation ........ 63
2. Considering Relevant Circumstances and Levels
of Causation .............................
63
F. Benchmarks Used for Determining Appropriate
Thresholds of Risk and the Difficulties Encountered in their
Establishm ent ..................................
73

Clifford D. Fisher, Professor and Chair of Economics and Business
Administration, Hanover College; B.A. & M.B.A. Eastern Washington University
(1976), (1980); J.D. Gonzaga University School of Law (1980); LL.M. Indiana
University School of Law-Bloomington (1993). This article would not have been
possible without the financial support of Hanover College. The author wishes to
gratefully acknowledge the scholarly research assistance, comments, and
suggestions provided by Jared Warner, a second-year law student at University of
Michigan Law School, Angela Muehr, a first-year law student at Pepperdine Law
School, and Matthew Beardsley, a first-year law student at Indiana University
School of Law-Bloomington. All three law students are graduates of Hanover
College.

1. Dealing with Imperfect Information ........ 79
2. Inconsistencies in Threshold Establishment .. 80
3. Superfund's Noble Aspirations and Glaring
Inefficiencies ............................
81
III. ACCOUNTABILITY AND REGULATION: STRIVING
TOWARD IGNORANCE ..............................
88
A. Use of a Cost Benefit Analysis ..................
89
B. Value of Life ................................
90
1. Market System Effects on Determining the Value
of Life ..................................
93
2. The Business Perspective ................
94
III. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION CONSIDERATIONS
AND APPROACHES .................................
113
A. The Cost of Environmental Regulation ..........
120
B. The Need for Environmental Regulations ........ 121
C. The Problems Associated with the Common Law Toxic
Tort System ..................................
124
D. The Proposed Move from Common Law Toxic Tort
Liability to Strict Liability .......................
131
1. Claim Filing under Strict Liability and Insurance
Industry Involvement under Strict Liability .... 143
2. Regulatory Standards and Specific Coverage
under Strict Liability .....................
144
3. Implementation of a Medical Review Panel . 147
4. Replacing Common Law Causation with
Proportional Liability .....................
150
E. Argument for Class Action Suits vs. Strict Liability
System ......................................
153
F. Implementation at State Levels .................
158
Conclusion .........................................

159

A ppendix A ........................................

164

2001]

CAUSATION AND THE TOXIC TORT SYSTEM

37

Introduction
In essence, Albert Einstein dealt with different frames of
reference when he developed the theory of relativity, which rejects the
concept of absolute motion and explains why motion, speed, and mass
appear different depending on the observer's frame of reference.
Einstein's theory changed what was perceived to be the laws of physics.
Moving from the natural sciences to the social sciences, this article is
intended to be the initial step in advocating a change in traditional
common law toxic tort and to provide an innovative and pragmatic
approach to handling toxic torts. Thomas Malthus stated, "...nothing is
so easy as to find fault with human institutions; nothing so difficult as
to suggest adequate practical improvements. It is to be lamented, that
more men of talents employ their time in the former occupation than in
the latter."'
This paper deals with the basic assumptions made in regard to
environmental issues and how they relate to law. This involves the
different distinctive perspectives assumed by individual disciplines,
which could be thought of as the different lens or framework that
disciplines' use. It deals with what each perspective assumes about the
world, people, and law.
The public perception of risk is covered in regard to voluntary
or involuntary risks and how this perception doesn't match up with
government's risk assessment. These contrasting visions, how they are
conceptualized, and the strengths and weaknesses of the different
disciplines basic assumptions are involved in this discussion.
Very little research has been done in regard to thinking about
frameworks, lenses, assumptions, and models that are being taken from
all different disciplines and becoming law. This paper has taken this
environmental discussion in regard to the perspectives of different
disciplines and indicated what the discipline would want the law to be,
what the law currently is, changes that need to be made, difficulties in
regard to changes, and recommended changes. All ofthis comes down
to how should government deal with these problems? How should we
I
THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE
(Anthony Flew, ed. Penguin Books 1985) (1798).

OF POPULATION
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regulate and to what extend should we regulate? Who should decide
and how?
It is difficult or in most cases impossible for courts using
common law tort theories to distinguish between injuries and increased
risk from environmental or non-environmental factors. The present tort
system may be efficient and may promote the correct result in the vast
majority of cases, but not in toxic torts. Therefore, this paper presents
the government's involvement, standards, regulatory approaches, and
significant recommended modifications to the present toxic tort system.
We hear about, see, or actually become involved with
government through taxes, regulation of industry in the production of
goods, or regulation of our own activities. Governmental risk
assessment influences all of these areas. The United States
Environmental Protection Agency has had a major influence on
environmental risk assessment over the past two decades. The EPA's
aggregate figures, though they might appear misleading, nevertheless
provide a conceptual look at how that agency has functioned over time.
The EPA has leveled an estimated $1.44 trillion in compliance costs
(1990 dollars) on industry since its inception in 1970. It has a staff of
18,000 and an operating budget of $4.5 billion, and the estimated
annual cost of complying with EPA pollution-control regulations for
Americans is $115 billion. This latter cost amounts to 2.1 percent of
Gross National Product and is equal to every American paying about
$450 more in taxes and higher prices. That is $1,800 for a family of
four.2
What determines where government and business spend these
billions upon billions ofdollars to control toxic substances, hazardous
waste, and air or water pollution? We would naturally believe that
these dollars would be used to maximize societal benefits.
Unfortunately, there is no exact answer, because these decisions deal
with available scientific information, the philosophy and psychology of
individuals, and economics and political values.
Since 1970, courts, Congress, and EPA regulators have plunged
into areas that presented often intractable controversies such as the need
2

Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, You Can't Get There from Here,

FORBES, July 6, 1992, at 59.
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for a clean and safe environment, the question of how clean or safe the
environment needs to be, and the requirements for economic growth.
Quantifying environmental values was disturbing enough, but it became
even more complicated when toxic materials, often essential to
industrial production, became involved. The EPA was often required
to devise regulations for using these toxic materials based on uncertain
evidence about their safety and health effects. The courts, Congress,
and the EPA had to decide whether they should focus on the parties'
rights and their relationship, or on society and its needs.4
The government, scientific, legal, and business communities are
struggling with how to trade-off deterrence against victim
compensation, administrative costs against economic efficiency, and so
on.5 Lawsuits for increased risk of diseases, injury, and death attributed
to benzene, cadmium, diethylstilbestrol, bendectin, Agent Orange,
Dalkon Shield contraceptive, radiation, asbestos, and other toxic
exposures have challenged established notions about causation, liability,
and compensation under our present common law toxic tort system. We
read or hear almost daily about chemicals that threaten our water, food,
air, and our lives. We hear terms such as greedy businesses, over or
under protective government, money hungry lawyers, lives lost, and
money wasted on worthless search for the individuals' safety. How
should government deal with such problems? How should we regulate
substances? To what extent? Who should decide, and how? This
paper will explore these trade-offs, the tension between private and
public risks, different perspectives, different lenses on how risk is
perceived, and the governments' cost of regulating risk. Finally, it will
examine proposed alternatives to the common law toxic tort system, and
recommend an alternative, which will eliminate the high cost of
delivering compensation through the courts, eliminate the slow recovery
process experienced by toxic tort victims, and which will not inhibit
socially useful actions of businesses.

3
4

KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR 306 (1989).
George P. Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REV.

537, 569 (1972).
E. Donald Elliott, Goal Analysis Verses InstitutionalAnalysis of Toxic
Compensation Systems, 73 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1361 (1985).
5
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I. SCIENCE AS LAW
Science as law is the reaching out to science as a normative
standard for government action. When public policy makers and
lawyers incorporate science into law, standards are different than in the
scientific community. Law is about normative structures, but under
civil law, we base decisions on the more probable than the standard.
Yet, the scientist's standard is a ninety-five percent certainty standard.
Politicians' questions sound like science, but politicians need to make
decisions right away.
Scientific evidence and results often lead to statutory laws and
regulations; however, scientific evidence is based on hypotheses, which
can be constantly updated. "Scientific conclusions are subject to
perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes
finally and quickly."6 This is the aspect that causes scientific evidence
to be periodically ignored during the law-making process. When
exploring science as law, it is important to look at the inter-relationships
between humans and nature. The concept of earth as a system is a
relatively new scientific mindset. Based on the idea that everything in
nature is interrelated and reliant on every other thing, this theory places
an equal value on all aspects of nature, humans included. Thus, "a tree
or a rock has as much right to exist as a person." 7
The combination of science and law is effective in the crusade
to aid and halt environmental damage. The partnership of scientific
research and the legal system has been successful in the past, but science
and law have also been in opposition. On the one hand, science is
concerned with objective truths and theories that can be verified by
those who have extensive training in scientific method.
Law involves rules and regulations translated by judges and
juries, who lack the knowledge to adequately and thoroughly evaluate
scientific evidence. Current environmental issues on trial require a far
Shana M. Solomon & Edward J. Hackett, Setting Boundaries Between
Science and Law: Lessons from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,
21 Sci., TECH., & HuM. VALUES 131, 132 (1996).
7
Tony P. Murphy, What Value Nature? A Legal Viewpoint, J. ENVTL.
EDUC., Summer 1996, at 6.
6
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deeper erudition about chemical reactions, the function ofecosystems,
and the limits to safe exposure, erudition which outreaches the scope of
knowledge possessed by traditional lawyers.
To properly assist the antagonist of environmental degradation,
specialization in all fields ofthe environment will be necessary. This
need opens up new opportunities for those considering a career in law,
but what about those who are currently practicing environmental law?
They would have the option ofhiring an expert assistant or continuing
their education. Just as an old factory would have to update its
production methods to meet new environmental standards, older lawyers
will have to update their array of knowledge to meet new environmental
standards for law.
An author in the field of science as law, Wendy E. Wagner, has
brought forth similar ideas in her article, The Science Charadein Toxic
Risk Regulation. In this article, Wagner alludes to a "science charade",
in which "agencies exaggerate the contributions made by science in
setting toxic standards in order to avoid accountability for the
underlying policy decisions."8 The implications ofan idea such as this
are of a situation where science is misused and misinterpreted in both
agency law and law in general. This brings to light skepticism of what
role science should have in the law.
A. The Evolving Consensus Concerning the Admission of
Scientific Evidence
The role of science in the courtroom was more clearly
established when the U. S. Supreme Court handed down the decision
9 Daubertestablished the
in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.
precedent concerning the "standard that should govern the admissibility
of scientific evidence at trial."'" Commonly two difficulties arise: how

8

Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95

COLUM L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).
9
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
10
Kenneth R. Foster, et al., Science and the Toxic Tort, SCI., Sept. 17, 1993,
at 1509.
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to determine relevant scientific evidence and how to interpret expert
testimony.
Previously, the precedent set by the Frye case held that expert
testimony was admissible only after it had been accepted as general
knowledge by the "particular field in which it belongs."" This ruling
was criticized for being elitist, in that it placed an unfair burden upon
those trying to prove the validity of their injuries. The controversy
sparked the acceptance ofthe Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, which
granted permissible almost all testimony by an expert left to the
discretion of the judge, whether fact or hearsay. 2
The Daubertruling recognized the fact that the Federal Rules
of Evidence supersede Frye; however, it was made clear that the
evidence presented in court must have a valid and pertinent connection
to the facts of the case. Under the Daubert framework, which
implements Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, the court must first
establish under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 104(a) whether the
expert will testify to reliable scientific knowledge that is helpful to the
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. After the court
makes that assessment, it must then make a Federal Rule of Evidence,
Rule 403, determination about whether the testimony would be
prejudicial, confusing ofthe issues, misleading to thejury, or waste time
by considerations of undue delay or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
Daubertestablished a non-exclusive list of specific factors used
to assess the reliability of proposed expert testimony, and it includes:
1.
whether a theory technique can be or has been tested;
2.
whether a theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication;
3.
the known and potential rate of error; and
4.
the "general acceptance" of the theory or technique. 3
It is important to understand that this list is not definitive or all
inclusive. The scientific evidence presented before the court must be
relevant to the case, and just because all ofthe aforementioned criteria
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12

FED. R. EVID. 703.

13

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
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are met does not mean that the evidence has to be admitted. After the
preliminary assessment of the scientific validity of the offered evidence,
the court determines whether the reasoning or methodology can be
properly applied to the facts in issue (that is, whether it fits the facts).' 4
A key to understanding the impact of Daubertis that, unlike its
predecessor analysis, it instructs the court to focus on the principles and
methodology used to reach a conclusion in order to determine if they
constitute the scientific method, rather than the general acceptability of
the conclusion itself.' General acceptability of the theory or technique
is but one of the several factors considered in determining validity.
The court's gate-keeping function means that an expert's bold
assurances of validity of the scientific method on which the expert's
opinion is based will not be enough. Instead, the party proffering an
expert must show by a preponderance of proof that the expert's findings
are based on science by introducing some objective, independent
validation of the expert's methodology. 6
The Daubert decision had been considered relevant only to
scientific evidence until the recent Supreme Court's decision in Kumho
Tire.'7 Kumho extended these standards to encompass testimony of
engineers and other experts who are not scientists. Daubert'sgeneral
holding setting forth the trial judge's general gate-keeping obligation
applies not only to tests based on scientific knowledge, but also to
testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge. Also, a
court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that
Daubertmentioned, and doing so will help determine the testimony's
reliability. However, the test ofreliability is flexible, and Daubert'slist
of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
8
experts or every case.'
The law gives the court the same broad latitude when it decides
how to determine reliability with respect to its ultimate reliability
14
15
16

1995).
17
1S

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
Daubert,509 U.S. at 593.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharamaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
Id. at 141, 149-50.
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determination. The purpose of the gate-keeping function is to ensure
reliability and relevancy, as well as to make certain that an expert,
whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.19
The Kumho decision has opened the door for both victims and
risk-creators in their attempts to use professional opinions from
economists, psychologists, sociologists, biologists, engineers, and an
array of other experts in the validation of their particular case. Yet,
there are still two problems left unresolved. Some judges who are
intimidated by the technicalities of scientific matters may not regulate
the admittance of evidence, but instead accept all expert testimony no
matter how irrelevant.2" The second difficulty arises with the timeliness
of knowledge, which will be discussed in the next section.
Psychological experts are easy targets because their testimony
is often grounded in what we might call soft science and involves
clinical judgments, professional determinations with which reasonable,
honest experts may disagree. This gray area is not unique to
psychological testimony. Scientists, economists, and engineers often
have conflicting but plausible professional opinions. Disagreement
among experts is not evidence that testimony is fraudulent or
unscientific, and all any expert witness can ever offer is an opinion.
That opinion generally must be one held to a reasonable degree of
scientific certainty, and no court is ever required to accept an expert's
testimony as true or even persuasive. 2 In Ruffin, plaintiffs, mother and
daughter, sued, alleging that carpet sold and installed by defendants was
defective, in that it caused them to experience physical symptoms such
as nose bleeds, rashes, chills, sleeplessness and racing of the heart.
About three weeks after the carpet was installed, defendants removed it.
However, the plaintiffs alleged that the symptoms remained and, in
general, that their conditions were caused by the chemicals in the carpet.
The plaintiffs' expert witness, who held a Ph.D. in physiology, said that
19
20
21

Id. at 152.

Foster, supra note 10, at 1509.
Charles P. Ewing, Yes: Good Lawyering Can Weed Out Unscientific

Testimony, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1997, at 76.
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she developed a test that heated the carpet to about 140 degrees, and this
caused fumes and odors to be produced. The mice were exposed to
these gases and the mice showed slight irritation that may be an
indication of discomfort for sensitive humans.22
There was other substantial evidence and testimony that this test
either could not be conducted by others, or that it did not produce the
results that the plaintiffs' expert said she found. The federal district
court struck the scientific evidence of the plaintiffs' expert, and thus
causation failed and summary judgment was entered and affirmed on
appeal. 3
The court's opinion in Ruffin is that under the Daubert
standards, the scientific technique used by the plaintiffs' expert was not
and could not be independently validated or replicated. This means that
the expert was not proposing to testify to scientific knowledge that
would assist the trier of fact. The court acknowledged and used the
non-exclusive list of factors found in Daubert to arrive at this
conclusion. It noted that the Frye decision is no longer determinative,
but clearly not dismissed. The Frye holding on general acceptance in
the scientific community now appears among the factors listed among
the Daubertcriteria. Yet, in arriving at this conclusion, the court also
held that in making preliminary determinations pursuant to Federal
Rules of Evidence, Rule 104 (a), the court is not bound by the rules of
evidence. Thus, in determining whether to admit scientific testimony,
the court may consider materials not admissible in evidence.2
In GeneralElectric v. Joiner25 , a recent U.S. Supreme Court
opinion, the Court ruled that federal judges are entitled to throw out
opinion evidence from qualified experts if it is not backed up by solid
science.2 ' The case before the U.S. Supreme Court involved Robert
Joiner, a 37-year-old electrician, who developed lung cancer. Joiner
had cleaned electrical transformers for eighteen years, where he was
22

Ruffin v. Shaw Industries, Inc., 149 F.3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1998).

23

Id. at 295.
Id. at 296-97.

24
25
26

General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
David G. Savage, Judges' Gatekeepers Role Expanded, A.B.A. J., Feb.

1998, at 41.
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repeatedly exposed to coolant chemicals, including polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCB). Joiner had two medical experts ready to testify that
they believed PCBs could cause cancer. They relied on research
involving infant mice who were given high doses ofPCBs and statistical
studies of electrical workers in Italy and Norway."
The U.S. District Court judge threw out the evidence prior to
trial, ruling that Joiner'sexperts were relying on a subjective belief, not
hard science. The U.S. Supreme Court determined thatjudges should
play a gate keeping role and that once a trial judge has tossed out such
evidence, an appeals court may not second guess the decision unless it
reaches the level of an abuse of discretion. 28 Often in the past, judges
may have been inclined to let evidence in and let the jury worry about
its relevance or validity. However, Daubertmade clear that there is an
obligation of the court to hear these issues.2 9 The point of calling an
expert witness is to put a teacher on the stand, someone who can bring
another set of eyes into the room through which the court can see the
facts and understand the case. Credibility is at the heart of every case
and the teacher is a fundamental symbol of credibility in our society.3"
B. Establishing Evidential Standard: Regulations vs. the Courts
Carl Cranor suggests in his book, Regulating Toxic Substances,
that regulators and courts should not use the same standards of
evidence, as scientists, when determining the limits and allowances of
toxic substances. The law allows and depends upon the testimony and
information provided by experts. However, there is some discrepancy
as to how responsive the law is to science. In many instances, the
information needed by courts and regulatory agencies is either
inconclusive, concerning a matter where scientific opinion is divided, or

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

James Podgers, You May Need to Learn More than Just the Law to Win

That Big Medical or High-Tech Case. Our Experts Tell You How to Get Started,

A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 34, 35.
30
James W. McElhaney, Terms of Enlightenment, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at
82.

2001]

CAUSATION AND THE TOXIC TORT SYSTEM

47

rests upon incomplete studies.3 In these cases, the information obtained
through research and the studies required to arrive at a legal conclusion
are uncertain and not yet regarded as common scientific knowledge. In
essence, the decision must be made before the evidence is definitive.
In the field of science, acceptable data requires a common
confidence level of 95 percent. In the field of law, a lower standard of
proof is acceptable in order to reduce false negatives. When ensuring
maximum legal protection, false negatives are costlier than false
positives.32 It would be much more detrimental to ignore the possibility
that a toxin can be fatal than to declare a false diagnosis of cancer.
Even if the risk ofharm is 65 percent, the danger cannot be ignored just
because it does not live up to the standards of causation set by scientists.
It can be argued that it is much safer to over-regulate than to underregulate when lives are at stake.
Complicating the issue even further is the idea of Wagner's
"Science Charade, 33 under which there is no way of knowing what
kind of scientific evidence you are getting. Is the "scientific" evidence
received in court actually based on sound scientific principles or is it
manufactured data by someone who needs an edge? This and other
issues above must be carefully examined when incorporating science as
a part of law.
There are problems that might occur when lawyers who are not
trained in the sciences have to deal with "science as law." One of the
main problems is that terms are often defined differently in the sciences
than in law. "Causation" is one of the most important words in this
category. The concept ofcausation grounds the issue of toxic torts, in
which the plaintiff has to prove that the defendant's conduct was the
cause of the plaintiffs harm.
According to the discipline of psychology, a given relationship
between two events is a cause-effect relationship if, and only if, it
satisfies the following three conditions: (a) Time-Order, (b) Correlation
or Co-variation, and (c) Absence of Alternative Explanations. There is
31

(1993).

CARL CRANOR, REGULATING Toyic SUBSTANCES 5, 10,

32

Id.at 44, 48, 91-93.

33

Wagner, supra note 8, at 1617.

44-45, 49 & 55
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' 34
a time-order condition: The "cause must occur before the [ ] effect.
In other words, it is clear that event 'A' cannot have caused event 'B'
if event 'A' occurs after event 'B'. Often, people do not realize the
importance of the time-order condition. For instance, people may
observe the following two phenomena: (1) parents constantly
disciplining their child, and (2) the child displaying aggressive behavior.
The observers may erroneously conclude that the child's aggressiveness
has resulted from the harsh parental discipline. However, it is also
possible that the child naturally exhibited aggressive behavior and that
this behavior required stem discipline, rather than vice versa. 35 The
second condition is correlation or co-variation. Ifa change in one event
causes a change in another, the two events are said to be co-variant or
correlated. An increase in the number of smokers in a country, for
instance, may be associated with an increase in the number of people
dying from cancer in that country (this is an example of a direct
correlation). The third condition in psychology is absence ofalternative
explanation. Even ifa relationship between two events fulfills the timeorder criterion and the two events are co-variant, there is no guarantee
that one of the events caused the other to take place. A third event could
have been the cause.
Suppose, for instance, that a study is designed to examine the
effects of sleep-deprivation on test performance. Subjects are divided
into two conditions; subjects in one condition are not allowed to sleep
for thirty-six hours before the test, and subjects in the other condition are
required to get eight hours of sleep the night before the test. As
expected, the subjects who were deprived of sleep average a lower score
on the test. After the experiment is over, however, the researchers
realize that each of the subjects in the sleep-deprived condition had
consumed eight beers the night before the test. The question then arises:
did these subjects perform worse because they did not sleep, or because
they were inebriated, or both?
The only research design that meets all the criteria ofcausation
is the experiment. Holding everything else constant (i.e., controlling for

34

JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY

(McGraw-Hill 2000) (1985).
35
Id.at 26.

25
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alternative, extraneous variables), the researcher manipulates one
variable (the "independent variable") and observes its effect on another
variable (the "dependent variable"). In an experiment, not only is the
criterion of co-variation satisfied, but the researcher can also ensure that
the time-order condition has been satisfied.3 6
Psychologists and other scientists determine causation by means
of statistical significance: a relationship is adjudged causal if there is
less than a five percent possibility that the relationship occurred as a
result of random chance. In order to be absolutely sure that all
alternative variables have been kept constant, the experiment must be
carried out in a laboratory.
Herein lies the problem with causality as applied to "science as
law": the determination of causation must be made outside the
laboratory-i.e., in the "real world" and, furthermore, the determination
always has to be made after the events have already taken place (in
other words, the events cannot be manipulated and observed first-hand
by scientists). In such a situation, it is absolutely impossible to control
every conceivable alternative explanation of the effect. In many cases,
it is also impossible to ensure the satisfaction of the time-order
condition. It is therefore clear that the law cannot accept verbatim the
scientific definition of the term 'causation.'
Forced to improvise, the courts have had to come to their own
decisions about what exactly constitutes causation. In the case ofAllen
v. United States, the court decided that if a causal link (from the
scientific perspective) cannot be proven between the defendant's action
and "a delayed, non-specific effect such as cancer or leukemia,"3 7 the
fact that an increased incidence of injury in a population follows the
defendant's "risk-creating conduct" is enough to rationally infer a
causal connection between the defendant's action and the increase in
injury.38 In other words, the courts have acknowledged that, in the real
Id.
Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247,416 (D.C. Utah 1984), rev 'd, 816
F.2d 14 17 (10th Cir. 1987); cert. denied 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
38
Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation ofCause-in-FactRules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 884-86 (1982) cited in Allen v.
United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 416 (D. C. Utah 1984).
36

37
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world, it is impossible to eliminate all alternative
explanations-therefore, a causal link may be inferred ifthe suspected
cause is correlated to the effect, and if the time-order condition is
satisfied. The court also criticized the arbitrary nature by which
scientists determine statistical significance, but it was unable to clearly
articulate the lesser standard of proof [it] will require in such cases.
While the fields of science and law remain two separate entities,
they are unable to act in the best interests of the people. As has been
demonstrated in the past, the partial incorporation of science into law
has been quite problematic. Either scientific standards of proof would
have to be adopted verbatim by the law, or the law would have to create
a justifiable rationale for excluding those standards.
C. The Role of Science as Law in the Field of Politics
In the world of politics, politicians analyze issues according to
how they affect their chances ofre-election. This form of analysis could
have a tremendous impact on the way a politician relates to his or her
constituents. Think of how much time and energy it would take for
politicians to educate their constituents on the numerous scientific
details that laws would have. Not only would they face the problem of
educating the constituents, but the legislators would also need more
personnel in order to analyze these complex laws. Unlike many other
areas, politicians are more interested in how to relay the laws to their
constituents than in the costs or outcomes of these laws; therefore,
educating constituents on costs or outcomes would probably not be a
huge priority anyway. To confront this issue, Congress proposed that
they eliminate the Department of Energy and create a Department of
Science which would research and analyze complex technological
bills.3" At the state level, the Wisconsin State Senate considered a bill
that would create an Environmental Science Council, an organization
which would provide advice to legislators when dealing with such
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complicated issues.4" As our nation continues to make tremendous
advances in science, there will be more rules that regulate technological
advances. Americans are also starting to look at law from a different
perspective. Society is upset by the government's handling of
environmental issues. People are beginning to feel that many legislative
decisions are fear-based instead of being steeped in scientific
conclusions.
One example of this change is the public's attitude toward
global warming. According to William Perry Pendley, president and
chief legal officer for the Mountain States Legal Foundation in Denver,
people "understand better that global warming is still largely theoretical
and that the scientific method has been compromised to accommodate
politics."41
1. The Difficulties Encountered When Attempting to Use
Science in Law-Making
Another example of the American people's changed perspective
is the Endangered Species Act. William Pendley, president and chief
legal officer for the Mountain States Legal Foundation in Denver,
indicates that "it's based on political science, not good science. It
doesn't consider people and it doesn't take into consideration the fact
that some endangered species can be common in one area and
uncommon in another."42 These conflicts between science and law
make it difficult to use science as law.
Using science for the basis of law is a new phenomena that is
occurring in the legal field. Science is starting to be used as a source of
evidence in court, rather than the legal standards that have been used in
the past. Many lawyers do not like this new occurrence because they
lack understanding ofthe scientific field. This controversy between law
and science is the result of the difference in the languages that lawyers

40

Senate to ConsiderBill to Form EnvironmentalCouncil, Bus. J. SERVING

GREAT MILWAUKEE,
41

1996, at 6.
Id.

42

Mar. 2, 1996, at 29.

Public Taking HarsherLook at EnvironmentalLaws, PIT&

QUARRY,

Feb.

52

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9

and scientists speak.4 3 This difference causes a question of legitimacy
in the evidence that is presented in court.
For example, when dealing with the definition of causation,
lawyers and scientists define cause differently. Lawyers define cause as
"justifiable reason." If a person is fired from his or her job for
embezzlement, "he is fired for cause."44 There are different sub-topics
of cause in the law field, such as probable cause, which is "the belief
that someone has committed a particular crime or actual cause," where
actual cause is defined as "the event directly responsible for an
injury."45 These definitions suggest that lawyers believe that one event
causes another event.
Sociologists, on the other hand, define causation differently.
Cause, according to social scientists, is defined as "a necessary
production of an event--an effect--by the prior occurrence of one or
more other events--a cause or causes."46 Social scientists try to avoid

the term cause and use the term correlation instead because of the strong
indication the word cause leads to.47 Although lawyers' and scientists'
definitions of causation do sound slightly similar, there is a fundamental
difference between them. On the one hand, lawyers say that one thing
causes something else. Social scientists, on the other hand, state that if
there is a cause and effect relationship, it could either be asymmetrical,
moving in any direction that cannot be changed, or symmetrical, when
two variables move in the same direction without one variable being the
cause of the other variable.48
Law and science have many different definitions that cause
conflict between the two very important fields. Lawyers want one
variable to cause another variable in an event. For example, a lawyer
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would want to say that person X caused person Y's death by physical
abuse. The physical abuse was the only cause of Y's death. In
distinction to lawyers, scientists feel that many variables could have
caused another variable in an event. For example, X committed this
crime because of factors such as his age (between 15-29) or his
environment (he lives in a community that devalues education and has
a high crime rate).
In environmental law, causation is also defined differently by
lawyers and scientists. It is difficult for lawyers to believe that the
statistics from scientists are legitimate because of the discrepancy in the
language.49 The essential issue with science as law is that it often
conflicts with traditional legal categories and training. As a result,
lawyers are not as effective as they could be with their rulings.
In order to correct this problem, lawyers must understand the
source of the problem, learn to use new techniques, and learn to ask new
questions. The problem arises from the conflict among scientists and
lawyers over how lawyers are traditionally taught to analyze problems
and the questions that modem science presents. Lawyers traditionally
graduate from college with a degree in history, political science, or
business administration. As business majors, they learned that cost is
important to avoid, and benefit is important to obtain. Therefore, they
are going to consider the effects ofa cost-benefit analysis long before the
scientific effects in a legal situation. Thus, lawyers are often confused
by the questions associated with the new science of risk and are not as
effective as they could be. For example, the book Legal Secrets:
Equality andEfficiency in the Common Law discusses the struggle to
find "a voice that fuses the vision of a social science with the material
ofthe law."5 Instead of viewing the new science as law as another tort
law or a typical case of evaluating expert witnesses, lawyers are being
forced into addressing new, updated approaches to science issues. There
is a difference between what a scientist assumes and what a business
person knows. From a business perspective, scientists assume that
213 ( 7th ed. 1999).
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professionals in other disciplines know what they are doing. Based on
this assumption, scientists might leave some crucial terms undefined.
Hence, a business person and a scientist may both use the same word to
mean two very different things. In common law, for example, words
such as "average" and "usual" can be symbols for strengths, whereas in
science, averages more than likely hide problems or cover faulty
techniques.
The fact that science is used as an alternative standard in
traditional legal disputes must also be considered for moral issues such
as risk assessment. In such a case, the use ofscience/economics is used
to determine whether conduct is "negligent."'" Essentially, with the
different viewpoints among scientists and lawyers, different practices
provide methods that are inconsistent with one another. Thus, it is
crucial to provide a consistent solution to the conflict to avoid tension
between the institutions. In this respect, someone with a business
perspective may think a certain situation has only one solution because
business wants the cheapest, yet most effective results. A scientist, on
the other hand, may consider multiple possible solutions to be correct.
In the same manner, it is difficult to draw a common legal tie between
the two different viewpoints. This difficulty, in turn, results in the
conflicting business viewpoint of science as law.
From a business perspective, the issue of science as law is a
serious one. Lawmakers are often able to draw on scientific principles
to create standards which are simply unacceptable from a business
standpoint. At the same time, some of these laws are advantageous to
the business community. There are major problems with the
interpretation of many ofthese laws because of the muddle of scientific
jargon. It all adds up to a complicated and controversial situation which
must be addressed.
Costs are a major concern for businesses because they directly
affect the ultimate outcome of what the profit will be. In the case of
regulations, which are loaded with scientific jargon, business incur extra
costs. Before they can put the regulations into action, they often must
pay legal costs to determine exactly what the laws require and to ensure
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that they are properly followed. This complexity places a significant
burden on the business sector.
There may also be flaws ofinterpretation in the implementation
of the new legal standards. If a business misinterprets a law and
implementation is not properly executed, that business could face a huge
loss in paying fines and legal fees. This loss represents another cost to
business. These kinds of complications show that there needs to be
improvement in how science and law work together.
As far as the proactive role of business in this situation is
concerned, there are some measures which businesses can take to
minimize the losses they suffer from this type of regulation. Most
importantly, they can establish their own scientific departments to work
full-time on these issues. Such a strategy would be a way of covering
themselves if any litigation were brought against them. They would be
less out oftheir element if they had their own staff of scientific experts
looking out for their best interests.
Not all regulations are bad for business. Many lawmakers take
the interests of business into concern when formulating these laws. For
example, in an article detailing the Superfund reform, it was mentioned
that "cities ...are critical of plans to require the most cost-effective
strategies, rather than sound science, to be employed when it comes to
cleaning up Superfund sites."52 Legislators are doing a kind of costbenefit analysis in this situation. They realize that the business sector
is a crucial element of our economy and that they should not create laws
which are significantly detrimental to business.
Ideally, businesses would like to see a trend moving toward selfregulation. A new set of voluntary environmental management
standards from the International Organization of Standardization (ISO)
is being touted by industry as a framework for redesigning the way it is
regulated. The series of principles, known as ISO 1400, is designed to
make it easier for businesses to track their own environmental
operations and performance. But while businesses are pursuing these
standards as a new opportunity to ease the regulatory throttle, regulators
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are waiting to be convinced.53 These programs provide a step toward
voluntary regulation, rather than forcing stringent legal standards.
The involvement of scientific principles in determining
regulatory environmental laws for businesses is certain and will become
more common as technology increases. Businesses' perspective is that
politicians should advocate a cost benefit when they examine the effects
of legislation on business before implementing laws which affect
businesses. Business has been striving to convince politicians and
regulators to loosen the regulatory controls through voluntary programs
within the commercial sector.
D. The Considerations Involved when Attempting to Establish
an Appropriate Standard of Care
A fault rule, as is used in the common law toxic tort system, is
preferable ifthe courts are likely to make errors in setting damages and
unlikely to make errors in setting the legal standard of care. A strict
liability rule is preferable if the courts are likely to make errors in
setting the legal standard of care and unlikely to make errors in setting
damages. Determining damages involves measuring the harm suffered
by the victim, and setting an efficient legal standard of care involves
balancing the marginal costs and benefit of precaution. The choice
between negligence and strict liability should be determined on the basis
of whether the court is more likely to make errors in determining the
harm suffered by the victim or in computing the marginal value of
precaution.5 4 The fault rule errors in setting the legal standard of care
for environmental increased risk when it incorporates classic tort law
principles in its analysis. In In re "Agent Orange" ProductLiability
Litigation,the court used the common law causation and preponderance
burden of proof to deal with victims who were trying to prove that seven
chemical companies had caused a group of Vietnam veterans and
members of their families to suffer various health problems as a result
of exposure to Agent Orange. The court dismissed this increased risk
Ronald Begley, ISO 14000: A Step Toward Industry Self-Regulation, 30
ENVTL SCi. & TECH. 298A (1996).
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argument in relation to the various health problems at summary
judgment by relying upon the common law tort legal standard of care.
These victims were never even provided the opportunity to present their
evidence to ajury because ofthe legal standard of care adopted by the
court." The Agent Orange case is a striking example of the court
refusing to consider any evidence except epidemiological studies of
veterans. Animal studies were rejected because they were not
performed on humans. Epidemiological studies ofindustrial exposures
were rejected because they were based on inappropriate data, a
population which was different from the veterans in amount ofexposure
and other characteristics. These particular studies were considered
insufficient as a basis for expert opinions, and thus inadmissible.56
A strict liability rule is preferable in environmental increased
risk cases if society is interested in reducing the transaction costs of
court trials and protecting individual rights. Under the fault rule of
classic tort law, if ajudge is inclined to sacrifice the rights of morally
innocent victims for the sake of social control, a court is also likely to
require the victims of socially useful activities to bear their injuries
without compensation. A difference between classic tort law and strict
liability is that under classic tort law whether the victim is entitled to
recover and whether the risk-creator ought to pay are distinct issues.
Whether the victim is entitled to recover depends exclusively on the
nature of the victim's activity when the victim was injured and on the
risk created by the risk-creator. In many instances, the risk-creator will
be excused because there is no basis for distinguishing between the party
causing the harm and other people. Whether the court can rationally
single out the risk-creator as the loss-bearer depends on our expectations
of when individuals ought to be able to avoid risks.57 Unfortunately, in
many instances today most individuals are not aware when they are
coming in contact with environmental hazards which increase the risk
of injury to their health. Therefore, individuals are commonly unable
to avoid anything except for excessive, unusual, or publicly known
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 745 F. 2d 161 (2nd Cir. 1984).
Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of
Persuasion, and StatisticalEvidence, 96 YALE L. J. 376, 392 (1986).
57
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risks. Who has the greater knowledge of environmental risks involved,
who is better able to choose to avoid these risks by altering behavior,
and who is better suited to compare the benefits and costs of the risks?58
Is it the risk-creator or the victim?
If the legal standard is too high, then the risk-creator's
precaution, from an economic prospective, will be too high. If the
standard is too low, then the risk-creator's precaution will be too low.
Tort fault rules make the risk-creator's precaution sensitive to variations
in the legal standard and insensitive to variations in damages. By
contrast, under a strict liability-regulated scheme, the risk-creator's
precaution would become sensitive to variations in the legal standard
and, through regulation of damages, sensitive to variation in damages.59
E. Establishing Causation and the Difficulties Encountered
when Taking Steps to Make Sure Both Sides Receive Equal
Protection
In today's world, the public is becoming more and more aware
of the dangers that everyday life poses. One area that is becoming more
apparent as a threat to lives is pollution produced by businesses.
Hazardous waste pollution creates a serious health risk to millions of
people. Pollution causes or contributes to a large and increasing
number of deaths or serious injuries from cancer, nervous system
disorders, or respiratory ailments.6" Who is to blame when an
individual gets sick and dies from toxins in the environment, and, more
importantly, who pays? This is the question that is causing an uproar
in business, science, politics, and the legal community.
Causation is the relationship linking an act and its infinite
number ofconsequences. There are two levels of causation, causation-
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in-fact and proximate causation. Causation-in-fact exists ifthe damage
to the plaintiff would not have occurred in the absence of the
defendant's conduct. This definition uses the more-likely-than-not rule
ofdetermination. Proximate causation sets rational boundaries in order
to determine liability according to factors such as the culpability of the
defendant and the strength of the link between acts and consequences.
In tort cases of negligence, the plaintiff must be able to prove
that: 1) the defendant owed a duty of due care to the plaintiff; 2) the
defendant breached that duty; 3) the plaintiff suffered actual damages
due to the breach; and 4) the breach was the cause of the plaintiff's
damage. Legal, or proximate, causation is one of the most elusive and
widely discussed obstacles to recovery for the toxic tort victim. 6 In
fact, it has generally been left to the discretion of the fact finder to
determine whether the link between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's harm is great enough to hold the defendant liable, because
concrete rules and formulas regarding causation seem impossible and
have been consistently met with failure.62 In other words, the issue of
causation has to be handled on a case-by-case basis.
The current procedure for an alleged victim of environmental
pollution's deadly effects to gain compensation is through a tort action.
However, there has been a cry from the public for reform of this system.
Society believes the tort system to be an unfair way for individuals to
gain proper restitution for their injuries. Plaintiffs across the country
cite one ofthe four requirements for a tort case, namely causation. "An
actor (in this case a business producing some kind of hazardous product
or contaminant) can only be held liable for negligent conduct if such
63
conduct is both the factual and proximate cause of another's injury.
This poses a problem for plaintiffs in toxic tort cases when there is only
speculative and inconclusive evidence linking their ailment to the
specific form of pollution or other product. However, businesses would
contend that before legislation is passed in order to change the system,
all sides of the issue must be examined. It must be understood that in
many cases the plaintiffs have in fact been able to prove proper
61
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causation and have won their settlements. Also, while it is evident that
sometimes the burden of proving causation is difficult, businesses would
argue that this burden is the very device by which defendants in such
cases are protected from unfair rulings. Businesses must be given equal
consideration when determining the fairness of the tort system in
pollution-related cases. There are a number of things that the public
comes into contact with every day that might cause us harm. Businesses
would contend that it is only fair to the defending parties that the injured
person prove a direct causal link between a company's conduct and the
person's injuries.
One of the major weaknesses in environmental law today is the
power of tort law. In order to prove that a risk-creator, be it a company
or government entity, was negligent in disposing of, using, or testing a
chemical product, a victim must prove a direct causal link. The cause
of the victim's illness must be directly related to the product and not be
affected by any other outside force. In a world that is full of so many
outside influences, an argument can be made that it becomes next to
impossible to prove this direct causality in environmental law. Causality
is effective in normal tort law because it is very obvious in a car
accident who or what caused it. However, in environmental law, one
argument is that the current concept of causality is inapplicable. In
negligence law, each person has a duty to behave as the reasonable
person would under similar circumstances. Once the plaintiffproves the
breach of this duty, he or she must then prove the direct causal link
between the breach and the effect. In nearly every tort action, the
plaintiffmust prove causation. Causation involves a two-step analysis.
The first step is factual causation and the second is proximate causation.
Factual causation is used to determine whether there is a connection
between the allegedly tortious conduct and the plaintiffs injury. This
cause-effect relationship is the part of environmental law that is difficult
for the victim to prove.
The difficulty of proving causation is exemplified in the
following case. In this case, Vietnam veterans and their family members
sued seven chemical companies who produced Agent Orange for the
war. It is clear that Agent Orange causes drastic and deadly health
effects. However, as Judge Weinstein of the United States District
Court, Eastern District ofNew York said, "the most serious deficiency
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in the plaintiffs' case is their failure to present credible evidence for a
causal link between exposure to Agent Orange and the various diseases
from which they are allegedly suffering."'
The victim's perspective is that it seems unfair to give so little
power to the alleged victim. It can be argued that by applying the tort
requirement ofcausality, the judicial system is favoring businesses and
abusing the victim. Yet it has been shown in the past that, if in fact
injury was directly caused by the conduct of a risk-creator, the courts
would rule in favor of the plaintiff. In the case of Graham& Graham
65 the plaintiffwas able to prove a causal
v. Re-Chem InternationalLtd.,
link between the hazardous emissions produced by Re-Chem's waste
incinerator and the damages done to the plaintiffs cattle. This case
showed that the current tort system does not make it impossible for a
plaintiff to gain for their damages. In this case the victims were not
forced to show that the emissions were the sole or even the dominant
cause ofthe resultant damage. It was sufficient to show on the balance
of probabilities that the emissions made a'material contribution' to the
damages.66 The judge found it not necessary to prove emissions were
the sole or dominant cause ofinjuries, only balance ofprobabilities that
they materially contributed. This proving causation is extremely
difficulty in environmental litigation, yet even when this has been
successful, the victim must still prove that the risk-creator is at fault.
Cases such as Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc. indicate how
difficulty it is to prove a causal link. In this case, residents who lived
near the company's fiberboard manufacturing plant claimed that
particulate matter released by the plant had caused a number of
afflictions. The court ruled that it is not sufficient for a plaintiffto show
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that a certain chemical agent sometimes causes the kind of harm of
which he or she is complaining. 6v The plaintiff must produce sufficient
evidence that the agent had made a material contribution to his or her
ailments. In this case, the plaintiffs were not able to do this; hence,
causation was not proven.
In every court case it is important that both sides be equally
protected. From the businesses' perspective, although the burden of
proving seems to put the victim at a disadvantage, it is necessary to
protect the risk-creators. A company that produces hazardous wastes
should pay for the damages that they have caused to the public and their
property. However, it is justified to expect proper proof that a person's
injuries were the result of the company's actions. If it were not for
causation, there is nothing stopping a smoker of forty years from
claiming that the emissions from a nearby factory caused his or her lung
cancer and consequently gaining compensation. Ifthe plaintiffcould go
on to prove that, in fact, the emissions were the cause of the cancer, then
the company must be held liable. However, the business is protected
when "it appears highly extraordinary and unforeseeable that the
plaintiffs injuries occurred as a result of the defendant's alleged tortious
conduct., 68 While the difficulty is recognized for injured persons to
prove actual causation of their ailments, the protection of risk-creators
against unfair claims and settlements keeps the tort system in place.
Both federal and state governing bodies have tried to enact legislation
that would establish hazardous waste personal injury compensation
systems. However, few have had any success in passing the statutes.
Businesses would agree that if a risk-creator contributes to the injuries
or ailments of victims or their property, it should be held liable.
However, from a business perspective, it is impossible to introduce a
system that would, in essence, hold a company liable without proving
proper causation.

67

Wright v. Willamette Industries, 91 F.3d 1105, 1107 ( 8 th Cir. 1996).

68

Valas, supra note 60, at 774.

2001]

CAUSATION AND THE TOXIC TORT SYSTEM

63

1. The Problems Associated with Scientific Uncertainty When
Attempting to Assign Causation
The problem with establishing causation is that the evidence
offered to establish it often cannot be presented with a high degree of
certainty. This is especially true when fact finders are at the mercy of
scientists. Because scientists are limited by factors such as ethical
testing procedures and unknown variables, the evidence they present is
usually incapable of being established to a degree of certainty high
enough to meet the burden of proof. For example, scientists are
expected to assign causation to many human diseases. The most
valuable way to generate information is by testing. However, because
of ethical implications, scientists are unable to use humans as living
laboratories. As a result, they are forced to use other organisms, such as
mice. It is difficult to prove causation in humans based on experiments
using mice. Also, scientists do not completely understand the
physiological mechanisms behind many human diseases like cancer.
Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand how
environmental conditions will affect them, much less prove that such
conditions cause them. Finally, humans are exposed to a lot of
environmental stimuli everyday. Some are drastic, while others are
subtle. It is very easy to link massive oil exposure to the death of many
organisms, and it is not very difficult to link ingestion of relatively large
doses oftoxic chemicals from a disposal site to leukemia. However, it
is much more challenging to determine that ingestion of subtle/minute
doses of chlorinated water by random people over long periods oftime
causes cancer. There arejust too many possible and unknown causes of
diseases like cancer to be able to assign each one proportional blame.
We can therefore forget assigning blame to a high degree of certainty;
it's just not feasible.
2. Considering Relevant Circumstances and Levels of
Causation
There are different degrees and conditions of causation. Some
acts linked to specific effects are intentional, while others are
unintentional. Also, effects take different amounts of time to manifest
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themselves, with some being obvious and others being discrete or
undetectable. We will look at three different types of causation
situations. The first is hazardous waste disposal. In this case, the act was
not intended to cause harm, the effects were not immediately obvious,
and the causal link has been generally accepted. For the second situation
we will use the example ofoil spills--unintentional acts with immediate
effects and a confirmed causal link. The final example is the
relationship between chlorine and cancer. In this case, the act was
intentional, though the effects are unexpected, unintended and latent,
and the causal link has yet to be confirmed. The latter is a public health
issue over which there is extreme controversy regarding causation.
Proof of causation in hazardous waste torts involves uncertainty
in both the legal concepts and the scientific proof. For example, in the
case ofAnderson v. W.R. Grace& Co.,6 9 residents of the community of
Woburn, Massachusetts, sued owners of contaminated land surrounding
municipal wells. Numerous people in the community had been struck
with leukemia and other serious illnesses, which they attributed to
dangerous concentrations of trichloroethylene (TCE) and other toxic
chemical solvents found in two of their municipal wells. The most
important decision regarding the case was a judge's ruling that the
defendants only had a duty to those people they could reasonably
foresee injuring as a result of their negligence.70 Thus, in this case,
while the duty identified by the courts seems to imply causation, it is not
stated explicitly. Compared to hazardous waste disposal sites, oil spill
sites are much more obvious. Accordingly, it may be easier to link them
to particular effects. In one case, Union Oil Company v. Oppen,7' the
court stated that the negligent conduct of the oil company, resulting in
the 1969 spill in the Santa Barbara Channel, "would cause a foreseeable
diminution of aquatic life."72 Since the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in
Prince William Sound, that area has experienced a decline in seabirds,
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seals, and herring. It has also witnessed a fall in the killer whale
population. However, a study conducted by several scientists, including
David Page ofBowdoin College (Maine), and funded in part by Exxon
Corporation found through sound scientific techniques that there was,
"no evidence for large-scale offshore transport ofExxon Valdez crude
to the subtidal sediments." This testing was performed after Exxon
claimed that the area had recovered.73 While causation has yet to be

established in the changes in sea animal life, it seems to have been
identified in the effects on humans. Steven Picou, a sociology professor
from the University of South Alabama, has documented widespread
depression and stress in town. He says that victims of these things hide,
as supported by the observations that people are buying more at the
liquor stores and sitting less in the bars. He compares this change in
social structure to that of killer whales suffering from the mass social
trauma ofan oil spill.74 So although oil spills are a much more obvious
environmental hazard, the impacts have yet to be firmly linked to their
effects.
What was once a feared deadly weapon, a grisly device of
World War I that caused soldiers to cough blood with one breath, is
now the major combative force on another front. The chlorine gas used
to annihilate countless troops is currently being used to destroy
microbial contaminants in drinking water. The year 2001 marked the
ninety-third year since chlorine was first used to purify water in Jersey
City, New Jersey. Such enteric diseases as typhoid fever, cholera,
dysentery, and hepatitis have been phased out of the water system in the
United States, undoubtedly preventing mass illness and death. Since
approximately 75% of the population consumes chlorinated drinking
water, any contamination would be widespread. 75 The potential scale
of such contamination is why some degree of concern arose when
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scientists began to question the existence of a causal link between
cancer and chlorinated water. This question of causation, however,
differs from the aforementioned. Many ofthe ill effects of oil spills are
immediate, irrefutable, and obviously linked. Effects of hazardous
materials contamination and exposure are longer term and generally
accepted. With chlorine, the associated effects are long term, the cause
is questionable, and the evidence is inconclusive.
Some studies report that drinking tap water increases the risks
ofcontracting bladder cancer by 21%, while rectal cancer increases by
38%.6 Contamination is prominent in these two areas because
"concentrated excretory products" are stored in those organs." The
chlorine reacts with organic matter such as leaves, twigs, or chemicals
from agricultural runoffto form halogenated organic compounds. These
are also known as trihalomethanes, which are carcinogenic. 78
Unlike oil spills, the realization of effects from drinking
chlorinated water is latent. It takes many years for the compilation of
trace elements to create adverse effects, in which time the exact water
source would be indeterminable, and factors such as old age or workrelated exposure to chemicals might be the true causal agent. Often,
diseases do not have a single cause, but rather a constellation of
component causes. Moreover, according to scientists at the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, injections of chlorine or
chloramine resulting in leukemia in female rats are the "clearest
evidence yet" of chlorine's carcinogenicity.79 This result still leaves
several questions unanswered. For instance, how different is the
physiology of rats compared to humans, and did the scientists inject a
relatively exorbitant amount that humans would most likely never
ingest during one lifetime?

76

Kathy A. Fackelmann, Hints of a Chlorine-CancerConnection, 142 Scd.

NEWS 23 (1992).

Morris, supra note 66, at 961.
University of California at Berkeley School of Public Health, Sunsetfor
Chlorine?, UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY WELLNESS LETTER, Sept. 1995, at 5.
79
Janet Raloff, ChlorinationProductsLinks to Cancer, 143 SCI. NEwS 343
(1993).
77

78

2001]

CAUSATION AND THE TOXIC TORT SYSTEM

67

For the past two decades, chlorine has been studied as a possible
cancer-causing agent, and the evidence is still ultimately inconclusive.
The EPA has spent about $500 million conducting research and has
come to no clear resolution."0 A technique called meta-analysis is used
to show stronger statistics in causal links. One meta-analysis conducted
at the Medical College of Wisconsin in Milwaukee found that there is
an association between cancer and chlorinated water.8 " It has been
observed by some economists over the past ten years that when an old
NFL team wins the Super Bowl (as opposed to an old AFL team), stock
prices increase. There is a definite association between the two, but does
that mean that winning the Super Bowl causes stocks to rise? Likely
not. Hence a mere association is not ajustification for a causal link. If
meta-analysis is one of the better methods of identifying a causal link,
and at best it only indicates an association, then other forms of testing
are obviously needed before it can be concluded that chlorine causes
cancer.
The Environmental Protection Agency reported that one
additional case of cancer will occur out of every 100,000 people who
will consume two liters of water every day for 70 years. 2 This is a
minimal risk, yet to scientists, one life saved is worth any cost.
Moreover, the Clinton Administration proposed a plan in the 1994
Clean Water Act to eliminate many uses of chlorine, even though an
article in Science News and many otherjournals reported that there is
no proof that chlorine itself causes cancer.8 3 The phasing out of chlorine
extends beyond water purification to include thousands of chemicals,
DDT, other pesticides, chlorofluorocarbons in refrigerants, vinyl,
plastics, bleach for wood pulp and paper, household cleansers, and
chemicals used in swimming pools. The uses are vast and the causal
link is weak. Before chlorine is eliminated, a cost benefit analysis is
tenable to determine ifthe risks outweigh the benefits and ifthe costs of
replacing millions of production procedures are worth the outcome.
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According to the UC Berkeley Wellness Letter from September
1995, there is no good substitute for chlorine as of yet, but one
alternative is ozone. Ozone is quite expensive, but has been used by
Europeans for several years. Five water treatment plants in Southern
California are willing to assume the great expense of using ozone and
the $150 million cost of converting their current chlorine-based plants.
Current research concludes that ozone leaves behind no toxic residuals
and presents no dangers. However, experts originally believed that
chlorine was also harmless. There is no way to determine if we will
discover a link in the future between ozone and cancer or other diseases.
If we do discover one, as the Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California responded, "[then] we're in a hell of a mess." 4 If billions of
dollars are spent frivolously across the United States for the renovation
of water plants, for no apparent reason, then a "mess" may be an
understatement.
Science encompasses research, development, and methodology
to discover and explain the mechanisms of our environment, species,
and world. A major part entails protecting the human life from disease
and therefore finding the causes of lung cancer, skin cancer, breast
cancer, leukemia, and AIDS is of primary interest. The causes of these
diseases could be one of many possible factors or a combination of
situations. When determining causation, sensitivity, specificity,
biological mechanisms, and strength of association need to be
understood. For example, a simple headache could be the result of a
sinus infection, bad eye sight,jet lag, sunlight, stress, or a combination
of these. Likewise, the cause of a headache is not easily definable and
will be different depending on the individuals' history. Also, even
though it is known that a diet of vegetables and fruits reduces the risk
of heart disease and cancer, the research has not shown the benefits of
the specific vitamins found in these foods.8 5 Consequently, scientific
research does not always provide a causal link to a particular problem.
Not only is research expensive, technology and methodology are not
always available or even known.
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Determining the causes of breast cancer and leukemia will
illustrate the difficulty in pinpointing one specific environmental or
biological cause ofan individual's disease. Leukemia is a usually fatal
cancerous disease characterized by the excessive production of white
blood cells accompanied by anemia. Research has shown that a variety
of things can cause this disease. For example, an association between
high levels of EMF and childhood leukemia was shown to be
statistically significant.16 Those children living close to huge power
lines are about 1.5 times more likely to develop leukemia than those
who do not. 7 Wertheimer and Leeper found children who had died of
leukemia were two to three times more likely to have lived in homes
with higher exposures to EMF. 8 Evidence has also shown that
leukemia can be caused by high levels of radiation and prolonged low
levels of radiation. 9 Many more survivors of the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki developed leukemia when compared to those
who were not exposed.9" Leukemia has also been shown to be a result
of a mutated gene called BRCA2 which is located on chromosome 13.9
Thus, an individual's case of leukemia could be caused by any of the
above or a combination. Defenders of the electric power lines would
suggest that the cause of an individual's leukemia was not EMF, but
simply heredity or a mutated gene. Determining the one specific cause
is difficult and almost impossible when looking at the person's life
history, which entails exposures to numerous chemicals, experiences,
and their hereditary line.
When the State of Massachusetts published its breast cancer
statistics for eight years, the Cape Cod area showed high levels of
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occurrences. 92 The research found that eight cities were at least twentyfive percent higher than the average and of these seven were located on
Cape Cod. The environmental conditions in the area may explain the
pattern of incidence. The researchers of the project are focusing on
radiation, EMFs, and synthetic chemicals such as pesticides. Radiation
and EMFs were given low priority due to the exposure levels in the
area. Due to the one aquifer in the area and the soil type, synthetic
chemicals became the focus of research and were hypothesized to
initiate breast cancer by causing damage to the DNA. Pesticides,
detergents, and plastics all contain synthetic chemicals that mimic
estrogen and interrupt hormonal metabolism. Cells in a laboratory
culturing human breast cancer cells were proliferating due to the plastic
test tubes they were stored in. The test tubes were releasing a chemical,
nonylphenol, that mimics estrogen, causing the cells to reproduce.9 3
Therefore, the source of these estrogen-mimicking chemicals could be
detergents, pesticides, and plastics. The source of these chemicals could
be pesticides used on forests, bogs, golf courses, lawns, or even nonpoint sources such as car detergent running in to sewers which are
released into the one aquifer. If the aquifer is saturated with chemicals
and can no longer filter the water free of toxins, the chemicals seep
through to the groundwater. If such seepage is found to be the problem,
assessing the one cause would be virtually impossible due to the number
of points the chemicals are coming from. Therefore, a causal link is in
some cases virtually impossible to determine.
In order for the courts to compensate those victims who are
suffering from environmental degradation, a system needs to be
determined to understand the cause of the suffering. Even though the
causation of suffering could be virtually impossible to determine,
research should still continue. As in the case of the Cape Cod study,
there is a need to pinpoint possible causes and look at the history of the
individual victims to record the specificity, sensitivity, strength of
association, age, genotype, experiences, and the location of any other
individuals suffering from the same disease. In a community like Cape
Julia Green Brody et al., Mapping Out aSearchforEnvironmentalCauses
of Breast Cancer, PUB. HEALTH REP., Nov./Dec. 1996, at 494.
93
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Cod that is suffering from a high rate of breast cancer, an environmental
factor is most likely the probable cause. Researching the environment
to determine environmental degradation could lead to the causes of the
disease. Once a list of probable causes is assessed, the points of these
causes need to be researched and those that do not pertain to the disease
or geographic area should be marked off.Granted, this kind of process
is currently occurring in some locations, and scientists might contend
that it is the best way to handle the situation.
As science becomes more and more advanced, science can
prove more conclusively cause and effect relations. However, these
advances still may not be enough for the legal standard. "In a
courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this
type is not scientific certainty but legal sufficiency."94 Science is not
conclusive; rather, it is continually improving and evolving. At this
time, it is nearly impossible to conclusively prove that A is a cause of
B. Science can prove that.A can, at times, cause B; that A in animal
experiments has caused B; and that computer tests show the possibility
that A can cause B. There are legal weaknesses with the three major
types of scientific evidence: non-human animal experiments, human
experiments, and epidemiological studies.
In non-human experiments, animals are exposed to the health
hazard and the effects are studied. However, such experiments "cannot
prove anything conclusively about human exposure, because human
beings are biochemically different from nonhuman animals."95
In an attempt to compensate for this uncertainty, scientists might
perform human experiments. However, there are weaknesses with this
method, too. In human experiments, scientists may expose human
beings in a controlled setting to mild doses, over short periods oftime,
of materials suspected of causing serious health problems when in
reality, exposure in terms of amount or duration is considerably greater.
Also, such tests pose ethical questions about testing humans and are not
usually practiced. The final scientific method of testing is to compare
the rate ofdisease in one population with that in another and then look
94
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at exposure to different health hazards in both populations. However,
it is difficult to establish in such a way that a connection is made
between a given suspected toxin and illness or death, for "under normal
conditions, people are exposed to many suspected toxins of various
strengths, for varying periods of time."96 Therefore, with such a test,
"[i]t is difficult to isolate the effect of any one substance."97 It is nearly
impossible to find the evidence required to prove direct causality. Both
victims and scientists would contend that this is unfair and unproductive
and therefore must be adjusted to give more weight to these scientific
types of evidence, even ifthe scientific evidence is not powerful enough
to prove causation. The risk-creators do not have a significant burden
in defending themselves and have a vested interest in keeping the
causation requirement because it protects them.
From a scientific perspective, there are a number ofthings that
can be done to improve current methodology. For example, scientists
could look deeper into situations and consider compounding effects
instead of only independent ones, for it is possible that some effects are
compounded or maybe even multiplied or synergistic. It has been
suggested that "[b]eing open to the possibilities of multiple causation
can help prevent the rush tojudgment that often characterizes errors in
attribution."98 Scientists could focus more on case studies than on
laboratory and field tests when it is not possible to assign definite
causation, as in the case of cancer. In this way, past situations that
suggest causation would actually form the foundation of establishing
causation in another situation.
Unfortunately, it takes time for situations to develop and be
analyzed, and it takes even more time to identify patterns and trends. As
frustrating as it may be, scientists and the public may have to be
patient. Everyday, studies are revealing more and more information
about diseases such as cancer. Until scientists have a more firm
understanding of how this disease works and what causes it, they will
not be able to unequivocally assign a cause. Perhaps in the meantime,
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it would be best for scientists to differentiate more between the words
relationship, association, and causation.
The process and the need to assign and determine a cause varies
greatly in the fields of science and law. Law focuses on fairness
(equity). Often, however, time constraints lead fact finders to make a
decision when they do not have conclusive evidence to substantiate it.
Scientists seek but rarely find absolute truth. Some of the most difficult
and costly issues in health and the environment are created by the
uncertainty about causation occurring in tort litigation and
environmental cleanup. In these instances, the cause of detriment cannot
always be determined by sound science. Issues of liability will arise and
costly litigation will result. Such examples include environmental
cleanup of water, where the sources of contamination are uncertain, or
compensation awards for such things as cancer. Jumping to conclusions
and prematurely assigning a causal link, such as some scientists did in
the case of cancer and chlorine, may do more damage than good,
especially if funds spent on the "problem" could be allocated to
environmental cleanup or research in other areas. At the same time, we
cannot stand idly by waiting for irrefutable evidence of causation
because we cannot be sure if and when it will ever be determined.
F. Benchmarks Used for Determining Appropriate Thresholds
ofRisk and the Difficulties Encountered in their Establishment
In dealing with risk assessment, we must determine the degree
of risk that is acceptable. The United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), under authority granted in the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1958, has used the "Delaney Clause" in its risk
assessments. What this clause says is that no carcinogenic may be used
in food production if it leaves residue levels of more than zero when the
food is to be consumed. EPA Administrator Carol Browner has come
to the defense of 35 pesticides that potentially cause cancer, but that
actually pose little threat to human health since they are consumed in
extremely minute amounts. Carol Browner contends that the 35-yearold Delaney Clause that bans carcinogens in foods should be modified.
The EPA has tried to modify Delaney to the extent that if researchers
determined that the level ofpesticide did not cause more than one extra
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case of cancer in I million people over a 70-year life-span, then the
amount was considered a "negligible risk" and therefore safe to
consume. The National Resources Defense Council sued EPA to
prevent it from adopting this new standard. In July of 1992, the San
Francisco federal appeals court ruled against the EPA and the court
indicated "that the EPA was not free to use its own discretion in
interpreting the Delaney Clause."99

The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA) replaced the
Delaney Clause which banned all levels of carcinogenic pesticides in
processed foods. Under the FQPA, all pesticide tolerances must be
reviewed within ten years to ensure a "reasonable certainty of no harm"
and to provide an extra measure of protection for infants and children.
The EPA says the agency is likely to prioritize pesticide tolerances to
meet FQPA requirements." The FQPA Implementation Plan is based
on five principles that the EPA contends will govern the agency's
actions: sound science; a protective, health-based approach to food
safety; promotion of safer effective pest control methods; an open, fair
consultation with stakeholders and an informed public; and public
accountability for EPA's actions and resources to achieve the goals of
the law.'0 ' The major provisions of the new law include: 1) establishing
a single, health-based standard for all pesticide residues in food, whether
raw or processed; 2) providing for a more thorough assessment of
potential risks, with special protections for potentially sensitive
populations such as infants and children; 3) requiring the EPA to
reassess roughly 9,000 existing tolerances (maximum legally
permissible residue levels in food) to ensure that they meet the new
standard; 4) requiring the EPA to develop consumer information to be
displayed in grocery stores about the risks and benefits of pesticides
used in or on food, as well as recommendations to consumers for
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reducing dietary exposure to pesticides while maintaining102a healthy diet;
5) requiring periodic re-evaluations of all pesticides.
The Delaney Clause had restricted the EPA's ability to allow
substances that cause cancer to be used in processed foods, no matter
how low the risks. The Delaney Clause would not let growers use any
pesticide that has been found to cause cancer if it leaves a detectable
residue. It applied what is known as the "zero-risk" standard.
A problem with risk assessment can be demonstrated through
how pesticide toxicity is assessed. The current assessment test tests only
for averages and completely disregards the effects that pesticides can
have on young children and the elderly. 0 3 It focuses only on the
exposure to pesticides that an individual gets when ingesting foods
sprayed with pesticides and fails to take into consideration the exposure
that one might get by other means. In June of 1993, the .National
Academy of Sciences released a report entitled Pesticidesin the Diets
oflnfants andChildren,which indicated that "the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) has very limited ability to ensure the
public that there can be adequate public health protection' 10without
major
4
changes in the way the agency conducts its program."
United States Federal District Court Judge John Daniel Tinder,
in essence, used the Delaney Clause in a Summary Judgment order
involving The Pantry,Inc. v. Stop-N-Go Foods."5 In his October 22,

1991 ruling, Judge Tinder, in direct conflict with United States
Supreme Court precedent, incorrectly relied upon the "one-hit" theory
of carcinogens and took judicial notice of the fact that benzene is a
known human carcinogen.106 The "one-hit" theory indicates that there
is no quantity of a carcinogen that an individual can be exposed to
without incurring some increased risk, and the theory suggests that even
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one molecule of a carcinogen, at the right place and at the right time,
can cause cancer.
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
PetroleumInstitute,07
' the Secretary of Labor promulgated regulations
for occupational exposure to benzene. The Secretary took the position
that no safe exposure level could be determined for benzene and
therefore set an exposure limit at the lowest technologically feasible
level that would not impair the viability of the regulated industries and
would also protect the employee's right to a safe workplace. The
exposure limit on airborne concentrations ofbenzene was set at one part
benzene per million parts of air (1 ppm).
Industry contended that epidemiological studies indicated no
excess risk of leukemia among workers exposed to benzene at levels
below 10 ppm. The Secretary of Labor rejected the industry's doseresponse assessment and concluded that reducing the permissible
exposure limit from 10 to 1 ppm would prevent at most one leukemia
and one other cancer death every six years.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Industrial Union Department,
disagreed with the Secretary of Labor and indicated that some risks are
plainly acceptable and that there must be a significant risk of harm
before the exposure limit can be reduced from 10 to 1 ppm, which
impacts an employee's right to a safe workplace." °8
OSHA estimated that changing the standard from 10 parts to I
part per million would save about 8 statistical lives per year for 45
years, at an annual cost of $24 million, or about $3 million per life
saved. Experts calculated that the EPA, under the Clean Air Act rules,
saves a total of three to four lives per year, at a cost of over $200
million, which is approximately $180 million to save a simple statistical
life. 10 9
The Pantry case is directly at odds with Industrial Union
Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute. Justice
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Stevens, in writing for the majority, provided for a threshold of
significant risks. He stated that some risks are plainly acceptable and
others are plainly unacceptable. If, for example, the odds are one in a
billion that a person will die from cancer by taking a drink of
chlorinated water, the risk clearly could not be considered significant.
On the other hand, if the odds are one in a thousand that regular
inhalation ofgasoline vapors that are two percent benzene will be fatal,
a reasonable person might well consider the risk significant and take
appropriate steps to decrease or eliminate that risk."'
The Supreme Court provided alternative states of the world
from bad to good, but did not quantify anything between the extremes
when it indicated that some risks are plainly acceptable and that there
must be a significant risk of harm before exposure limits could be
reduced. The court is assuming that individuals or firms who make
decisions are maximizing specific objectives. For example, consumers
are maximizing utility, and businesses are maximizing profits. This
may be a process of reducing law "to economics by substituting
economic concepts for such traditional legal concepts asjustice, right,
duty, and negligence when the magnitude of the risk is evaluated."''I
The Secretary of Labor, with the resources available under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, could not demonstrate a
significant risk below 10 ppm, and yet Judge Tinder in the Pantry,Inc.
decision indicates that the carcinogenicity and toxic nature ofbenzene
is unchallenged and takes judicial notice that benzene is a known
human carcinogen. Judge Tinder has gone beyond the Supreme Court's
findings, and, without supportive scientific evidence, has determined
that any amount of benzene is a carcinogen.
It is the author's opinion thatjudicial notice in this case is not in
compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence and that a question of
fact exists. If Judge Tinder's analysis is correct, then we should all
discontinue pumping our own gasoline, since, according to a 1985 EPA
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study entitled Self-Service Station Vehicle Refueling Exposure Study,
a person filling up a car with gas breathes an average of I ppm of
benzene." 2
The benzene situation involves a problem of imperfect
information reviewed by a court, rather than a panel of scientists,
physicians, and attorneys with technical and scientific expertise. For the
common law tort liability or property rights remedy to work, "the court
must know the true damages suffered by the victims."'" At the present
state of science and technology, imperfect information lead to Justice
Stevens's broad statement as to what a reasonable person might consider
a significant risk.
Even if it is a significant risk regulation, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
- commonly known as Superfund and the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) - excludes petroleum, "including crude
oil or any fraction thereof' that CERCLA/SARA does not list as a
hazardous substance, from the definition of hazardous substances,
pollutants, or contaminants."1 4 Thus, substances within the petroleum
exclusion are not covered by CERCLA requirements. EPA has not
clearly defined the scope of the petroleum exclusion, creating
substantial uncertainty in the spill reporting requirements under
CERCLA. A major problem in interpreting the exclusion is that some
listed hazardous substances, such as benzene, are present in most, ifnot
all, petroleum products. EPA has interpreted the petroleum exclusion
to exclude in their entirety pure petroleum and pure petroleum fractions
that occur naturally, even though they contain substances that are
otherwise listed hazardous substances. The EPA interprets the term
"petroleum" to encompass crude oil and crude oil fractions, including
any indigenous hazardous substances.
The EPA has not established clear rules governing petroleum
additives; the agency's position is that hazardous substances added
during refining are within the exclusion if they are added to a
112
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substantial amount of all petroleum products during refining. For
example, gasoline including the increased level of benzene due to
refining is within the exclusion. There is no published EPA guidance
about the exact meaning of"substantial amount." The EPA maintains
that hazardous substances added to petroleum beyond the normal course
of refining are not excluded." 5
1. Dealing with Imperfect Information
As we move from benzene to lead when considering increased
risk, imperfect information, and individual rights to a clean and safe
environment, the question becomes: "Is the lead threat in the United
States serious?" Millions ofAmerican children suffer from long-term
neurological and developmental disorders associated with high blood
lead levels. It is estimated that 400,000 babies are born each year with
high blood lead levels. Scientists indicate that there are 2 million
children whose IQ levels do not reach the genius level because of
minimal exposure to lead, in spite of efforts to eliminate the presence of
lead in gasoline, paint, baby food cans, and pipes.' 16
The issue is further complicated by controversies within the field
of lead poisoning study. The Wall StreetJournalreported on possible
misconduct by a leading figure in the field of lead poisoning. The
allegations of misconduct were leveled by the University of Pittsburgh
at the request of the National Institute ofHealth. They focus on Herbert
Needleman, a top research scientist and advisor to the Centers for
Disease Control and the U.S. government on lead issues. The inquiry
panel at Pittsburgh, in their report, stated that it was doubtful that the
two reports by Dr. Needleman "represent a fair and accurate
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ascertainment" of the relationship between lead and intelligence
quotients in the first and second graders under study. 17
Congress has considered a number of bills on lead, including
measures that would compel sellers to disclose to buyers lead's presence
in houses. Also, the Centers for Disease Control recently lowered its
threshold by sixty percent of dangerous levels of lead in the blood. Dr.
Needleman was one of 14 scientific advisors who aided the Centers for
Disease Control in deciding this new standard.' Imperfect information
is one of the most difficult issues in dealing with increased risk. It
makes it difficult to set scientific standards or legal liability standards.
These environmental exposures to lead, benzene, dioxin,
asbestos, pesticides, hazardous wastes, and other hazardous chemicals,
have created major lawsuits in the area of toxic torts. The field of
"'toxic torts' [has] become a growth industry for lawyers" and
government regulators and has become of increased "interest to the
media.""' 9 The extensive litigation and regulation in relation to
environmental exposures has focused primarily on the issue of
causation, thresholds, cost-benefit analysis, and admissible evidence.
2. Inconsistencies in Threshold Establishment
The Industrial Union case brings us from the Delaney Clause,
in which no safe exposure level can be determined, to determining
acceptable risk. Acceptable risk equates with de minimis risk. Risks
are considered infinitesimal or trivial and unworthy of any preventative
response until the risk reaches the upper-bound for de minimis risk. At
this upper-bound, we have a threshold. Any risk above this level is
unacceptable and any risk below it is acceptable or de minimis.
Government agencies are inconsistent in regard to the thresholds
they set. Some of these inconsistencies result from Congressional
political pressure and impressions of what the administrators think is
Gary Putka, Research on Lead Poisoning is Questioned, WALL ST. J., Mar.
6, 1992, at B i.
118
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119
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best for society. In such cases, there is no rational perspective on the
impact of the costs incurred by industry, consumers, taxpayers, or
citizens' rights groups. These inconsistencies relate to the concept of
maximization. Consumers are said to maximize utility, firms in
industry maximize profits, politicians maximize votes, and charities
maximize social welfare.120 Congress, in order to maximize votes, will
respond to the public's hysteria on particular issues and will not select
and implement laws that provide the best benefit to the citizen in
relation to the costs.
Whether it is because of laws or because of our own reaction to
situations, individuals do not always select the most rational cost
effective choice. This choice is characterized by what society is willing
to spend in order to save an unknown life, in contrast to the huge sums
of money society is willing to expend to save a particular life, such as
the little girl that fell down the well. How society allocates "resources
between life saving and other ends is based on a judgment about the
relative worth of human life, but [it] makes no sense to use resources
allocated to save lives in any way other than that which saves the
greatest number of lives."12' These inconsistencies will be covered in
the section titled the Value of Life.
3. Superfund's Noble Aspirations and Glaring Inefficiencies
When Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980,
environmentalists praised the litigation. Superfund, as the legislation
came to be called, would finally clean the environment. Years of
accumulated hazardous waste would soon be removed and would no
longer pose a serious health risk to humans, animals, or the
environment. Unfortunately, this vision did not come to fruition. The
process of cleaning up Superfund sites requires money. Superfund has
two main sources of funding. One is a trust fund that receives
contribution money from both corporate environmental income tax and
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petroleum and chemical feedstocks excise taxes. 22 However, this trust
fund alone does not cover all necessary expenses. Once a site is placed
on the Superfund National Priority List, the EPA investigates to find
which risk-creators, whether they are business, non-profit and/or
government, are potentially responsible for the dumping. These riskcreators, if found liable, must pay for the cleanup.
Legally, causation involving a causal link must be established
in a court of law by a preponderance of the evidence. 23 Basically, it
means proving that more likely than not X caused Y. For example, a
business has dumped hazardous toxic wastes into a lake and all the fish
die. The EPA investigates to determine ifthe business dumping was the
direct cause of the death of the fish. If evidence dictates that the business
is responsible, this causal link is enough to charge a business with
liability. The goal is to clean the environment, and the risk-creator must
pay the cost. Most cases, however, involve more than one risk-creator
known as the potentially responsible party (PRP).
Superfund is designed to deal with multiple responsible riskcreators; however, designs are not always flawless. Superfund liability
assessment exists in three forms: strict, retroactive, and joint and several.
Under strict liability, a potentially responsible party can be held liable
even if it can demonstrate that it dealt with hazardous wastes in a nonnegligent, legal manner.'24 Retroactive means merely assigning liability
for contamination that occurred before 1980. Underjoint and several,
one risk-creator can be assessed with one-hundred percent liability, even
if it is not the only polluting part. 25 Likewise, the risk-creator might
even have polluted at a fraction of the daily outflow, but can be forced
to pay for all of the damages. This powerful weapon to stimulate
significant compliance, settlement, and cost recovery has become a way
to hurt the little guy who isjust playing by the same rules as everybody

Don Dzikowski, Cleanup Project Begins at Superfund Site in Norwalk,
FAIRFIELD COUNTY Bus. J., Oct. 14, 1996 at 1.
122
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else.' 26 Under present Superfind legislation even a minor polluter at a
Superfund site can be forced to pay for the full cleanup costs if other
responsible parties cannot be prosecuted, regardless of the number of
other polluters, all because the little guy was proven to be liable merely
because of a causal link. Since 1984,127 the Kellogg-Deering site in
Norwalk has been on the Superfumd National Priorities List. Four
potentially responsible parties have been identified by the EPA,
including EDO Corp., Plessey Inc., Vernitron Corp. and Pitney Bowes.
Of the four, EDO Corp. is paying the lion's share of the costs. All of
these companies engaged in illegal, but common practice, by dumping
during the 1950s and 1960s. Even though these activities took place
before the Superfund legislation was passed, the retroactive liability
2
section of Superfund requires that the responsible companies pay. 1
Pitney Bowes has agreed to pay approximately one-fourth of the cleanup costs, although they do not concede liability. Pitney Bowes appeared
on the EPA's list ofPRPs because Pitney Bowes used to reside in one of
the buildings on the property. Pitney Bowes affirms their past history as
a well established record of proactive environmental initiatives.1 9
The government is trying not to fund Superfund site clean-ups
with taxpayer's money, so the responsible risk-creator must pay. But do
these companies actually write the check? James Ridgeway suggests
that the insurance firms standing behind the industrial corporations must
shell out as much as three-quarters of all the money. Standard & Poor's,
the financial credit service, reports that losses tied to environmental
liability claims could end up radically altering the structure of the
property/casualty insurance industry.13 ° This drain on insurance
companies demonstrates a serious problem caused by Superfund's
liability assignments.
Another significant problem demonstrated in the KelloggDeering Superfind site example is the delay caused by the litigation.
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According to the CongressionalQuarterly Weekly Report, Congress
had discussed the possibility of revamping Superfund. 3 ' Republicans
say the problem has been tangled in a web of litigation that has slowed
toxic waste cleanup; relatively few of the hundreds of Superfund sites
have been cleaned up.' 32 Thus, the problems created by the current
Superfund legislation do not go unrecognized by legislators.
The debate within the administrative branches of government
pits the Republicans against the Democrats. Much of this debate centers
around scaling back Superfund's liability provisions requiring
businesses to pay for cleaning up toxic waste. Republicans argue that
exempting some businesses from such costs would actually speed
cleanups by clearing away much of the litigation that has stymied the
program. The Administration and its Democratic allies in Congress
have been reluctant to embrace broad liability repeal. They say this
repeal would let polluters off the financial hook, shifting more of the
cost to taxpayers. In their 1996 campaign efforts to portray the
Republicans as anti-environment, the Democrats used the Republican's
desire to relieve businesses of the responsibility for paying to clean up
toxic waste sites they created before 1980.'
The present Superfund legislation has apparent inefficiencies.
It is a time-consuming process, and it is simply not accomplishing its
goal to clean up the environment. Senate Republicans have unveiled a
proposal to revamp the Superfund hazardous waste cleanup program,
but they were immediately accused by Democrats and environmentalists
of shutting them out of the bill-drafting process. The bill would loosen
the retroactive liability provision, which would remove liability from as
many as seventy-five percent of businesses that are now required to pay.
While advocates for the bill insist that it will speed cleanups by avoiding
much of the litigation, opponents contend that ifthis bill passed, costs

Allan Freedman, GOP's First Bid on Superfund Draws Democrats'Flak,
55 CONG. QUARTERLY WEEKLY REP. 240 (Jan. 1997)
132
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would shift from businesses to taxpayers, which they feel is
unacceptable. 34
'
Efforts to reauthorize the Superfund program have been stalled
by Congress because of a number of issues, including disagreement
over who is responsible for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. In the
Senate, a Republican effort titled the Superfund Cleanup Acceleration
Act of 1997 has been proposed. Unlike previous Republican reform
proposals for Superfund, it would not eliminate all liability for pre- 1980
disposal activities. 35

Instead, the Acceleration Act would cap liability of owners and
operators of sites receiving municipal solid waste and sewage sludge.
The Act would also exempt from liability all waste generators and
transporters at co-disposal landfills for conduct before 1997 and small
businesses and individuals contributing only a minimal amount of waste
to a site. It would replacejoint and several liability at multiparty sites
with a "fair share" allocation system in which responsible parties are
required to pay only for the harm that the responsible party actually
caused. 36 ABA Governmental Affairs Director, Robert Evans, has
stated that by making all partiesjointly liable for a given site, Superfund
has resulted in imposition of liability which is grossly disproportionate
to the conduct involved, perverting rather than implementing the
polluter-should-pay principle.' 37
Although this topic is a source of debate, it is at least being
reviewed. Politicians are aware of Superfund's failure to accomplish
its goal. The environment must be cleaned, someone must pay the bill,
and the allocation for the payment must be fair. This is a tall order to
fill.
In the hazardous waste site cleanups under Superfund, the
standards are so stringent that the rigidly strict site cleanup requirements
ultimately impose high costs without achieving significant additional
safety benefits when trying to cleanup the last 10 percent. Leo

134

Id.

135

Elizabeth Rogers, Cleaning Up SuperfundLaw, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1997, at

91.
136

Id.

137

Id.

86

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9

Levenson, a former EPA Superfund project manager, put the problem
succinctly when he noted that about 95 percent of the toxic material
could be removed from waste sites in a few months, but years are spent
trying to remove the last little bit. Removing the last 5 to 10 percent
can involve limited technological choice, high cost, devotion of
considerable agency resources, large legal fees, and endless argument. 3 '
EPA uses thresholds, and for post-remediation Superfund
cleanup their cancer-risk goal is to have thresholds fall within the range
of 10- 4 to 10- 6. EPA's second crucial risk decision on post-remediation
cleanup is that the cancer risk should not be exceeded by more than 5
percent to 10 percent of the population potentially exposed.' 39
EPA is using the 10- 5 risk level for Superfund sites with
mixtures of different types of chemicals such as solvents and PCBs. The
Massachusetts State Superfund Program now uses the 10-5 risk level as
a permissible level in hazardous waste site cleanups. Also, a Tufts
Center for Environmental Management paper compares four
carcinogenic risk goals: for the EPA, 10 -4 to 10-7; California, 10-6; U.S.
140
Army, 10-5; and New Jersey, 10-6 at hazardous waste sites.
The EPA's adopted level would assure no adverse health effects
if someone were exposed to the toxic substance in that concentration for
his or her entire life. EPA based the level on the weight of the evidence
ofcarcinogenicity and upon risk assessment. Substances classified as
known or probable human carcinogens were assigned a risk level of 1
in 100,000 (i.e., 10-5), whereas substances classified as possible human
carcinogens were assigned a risk level of 1 in 10,000 (i.e., 104).141
Under CERCLA/SARA, the President has broad freedom to
respond to actual or threatened releases oftoxics.142 Threatened, not
actual, releases are enough to give rise to authority to act under
CERCLA. The President has delegated this authority to the EPA for
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land, groundwater, and surface water and to the Coast Guard for
navigable waters under Executive Order 12580. The threatened or
actual release is very broadly defined as a pollutant or contaminant
which includes just about any substance that, upon release into the
environment, may cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities,
cancer, genetic mutation, physiological malfunctions, or physical
deformities. "'
Superfund does not impose liability for increased risk, medical
costs, or injury to individuals. Although SARA did not amend
CERCLA to impose liability for personal injury or increased risk, it has
made it easier for victims to bring personal injury lawsuits.' 44
Superfund created the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) as an agency within the Public Health Service to
work with other government agencies to implement Superfund's healthrelated policies which include:
0
establish and maintain a national registry of serious diseases and
illnesses and a national registry of persons exposed to toxic
substances;
0
maintain literature, research, and studies on the health effects of
toxic substances;
0
maintain a listing of areas closed to the public or restricted in
use because of toxic substance contamination;
*
provide medical care and testing to individuals exposed to toxic
substances, including but not limited to tissue sampling,
chromosomal testing where appropriate, epidemiological
studies, or any other assistance appropriate under the
circumstances;
*
conduct periodic survey and screening programs to determine
relationships between exposure to toxic substances and illness;
*
perform a health assessment for each facility on the National
Priority List (NPL);
•
work with EPA to compile and periodically revise a list of
hazardous substances most commonly found at facilities on the
NPL that pose significant threats to human health;
143
144
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*
*

prepare toxicological profiles of the substances on the list; and
initiate research to determine the health effects of
substances on the list, ifexisting information about a substance's
health effects is inadequate.' 45
The information ATSDR is generating, such as health
assessments and health effects studies, may be useful to victims of
increased risk.
Congress, by statute, has imposed strict liability standards under
CERCLA, and the SARA amendments have not changed this
liability. 46 Strict liability refers to the standard of liability. It means
that there is no need to prove any intent or negligence. Even if there
was no negligence or intent on the part of the risk-creator, the law holds
that party liable without regard to fault.
III.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND
STRIVING TOWARD IGNORANCE

REGULATION:

Since the establishment of the EPA in 1970 and the occurrence
of the Green Movement, there has been a need to determine the specific
source of pollution for both monitoring and regulation purposes. Due to
their parsimonious attitude, many risk-creators avoid claiming
responsibility for any pollutants that cannot be directly traced to them.
It is in the risk-creators' best interest to not conduct research that might
tie responsibility for pollutants to them. This is where the "striving
toward ignorance" idea comes into play. Wendy Wagner writes about
the "penalty for knowledge" that exists when dealing with such toxic
tort cases: At present, common-law courts place the entire burden of
proving causation on plaintiffs, a burden that includes responsibility for
resolving both 'trans-scientific' and 'preventable scientific
uncertainties.'...Although this burden is not problematic in a handful
of 'hot' toxic tort cases in which a wealth of studies have been
produced, such cases are the exception rather than the rule.' 47

W
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Such a practice, Wagner says, "offer[s] manufacturers practical
immunity for remaining ignorant about the latent hazards" they are
likely responsible for.148 Because of the way the common law tort
system works, when toxic tort cases are handled through this system,
ignorance is promoted. The risk-creators producing the toxins that harm
the people have no reason to study and research the effects of their
actions; rather, they have every reason not to.
The common law approach in dealing with toxic tort cases is all
wrong in theory. Not only does it create a motivation for ignorance
with regard to the effects of certain toxins, but it is also not consistent
with the utilitarian theory that is central to the common law system. For
a number of reasons (politics and the role of the media being two of
them), our common law approach to tort cases is not achieving the
greatest good for the greatest number of people. Simple economic
analysis (cost benefit analysis and value of life analysis) will support
this.
A. Use of a Cost Benefit Analysis
Criticism of cost-benefit analysis has been abundant, mostly
contending that it is inhumane to apply a cost-benefit analysis to
conflicts and issues ofhuman behavior, particularly when this method
of analysis leaves out the role of human emotion. Nevertheless, the
approach has become entrenched in both academia and jurisprudence,
so much so in fact that Justice Richard Posner has indicated that it is not
49
a criticism to say that the economic approach portrays a cold world. 1
Congress has forbidden cost-benefit considerations under
Superfund, yet required cost-benefit analysis under Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) legislation. 5 ° It makes a
difference to Congress whether an agency is dealing with the nation's
food supply and with major lobbying by agricultural interests, or
whether the issue before the agency involves hazardous waste in a
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landfill. Hence, Congress has enacted different standards which
confuses matters further.
Should this actually be the case, or should legislation be
consistent and deal with cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness
across the board? Should this legislation, in regard to Superfund, be
cost-oblivious? Is it socially responsible for government to require
industry, primarily, to take actions that cost more than they benefit
society? The following sections titled Value of a Life and Market
System will provide examples of why government's cost-oblivious
approach is irresponsible and does not provide maximum benefits to
society. This analysis is based on the value ofa life and the author's ten
years as a governmental risk manager and attorney.
B. Value of Life
Since society, through its political processes and agencies, does
in fact make decisions on regulations and investment expenditures that
occasionally increase or reduce the number of deaths, an implicit value
of human life has been calculated. These are implicit values placed on
human life by the political process. The justification appears somewhat
circular, even when we ignore the political realities of a democracy,
since decisions to regulate certain industries or invest in certain projects
are not determined by popular vote, but rather by government making
decisions not always motivated by the desire to advance the general
welfare and are sometimes the outcome of political conflicts. This
means that an implicit value attributable to the loss of a life by a
particular product will differ widely.'
A regulatory agency like the EPA must gather, develop, and
analyze relevant information about the activities that it wishes to
regulate, and about available control techniques, before it can address
the ultimate task of implementing the statutory trade-off between safety
and cost.' 2
151
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In dealing with the Delaney Clause (cost-oblivious), threshold
standard, or cost-benefit analysis, agencies are searching for the danger
to the public health or welfare. "Cost per life theoretically saved" or
"value of a life" are terms used when evaluating what the economic
costs have been for particular activities.
In the past three decades, the Federal government has become
increasingly interested in keeping us alive. Agencies have been created
to deal with traffic, consumer, environmental, and occupational safety.
The government has become involved with lifesaving programs and has
to deal with the question of "how much is a life worth?" The costbenefit analysts have moved away from valuing dams and are now
valuing lives. Cost effectiveness analyses are being conducted by
agencies in which an estimate is made in relationship to how many lives
could be saved at various levels of expenditure, and then it is up to the
agency to determine how much businesses, consumers, and citizens can
afford. These processes are implicitly putting a value on lives. Yet,
while "there is considerable agreement among economists about the
need to calculate 5a3 value for life, there is no consensus as to how it
should be done."'
Yale Law School Professor and recent EPA general counsel, E.
Donald Elliott, indicated that he had never seen a single EPA proposed
regulatory rule where we were not paying at least $100 million per life;
and he saw rules costing up to $30 billion. John Goodman of the
Dallas-based National Center for Policy Analysis reports a 1990 EPA
regulation on wood preservatives that imposed costs at a rate of $57
trillion per life presumed saved.' 54 Clayton Gillette and Thomas
Hopkins did a review of agency valuations of human life and found
that EPA uses a figure ranging from $400,000 to $7 million per life
saved. EPA estimates that if all coal-burning power plants are required
to be retrofitted with the best available control technology, expected
annual incidence can be reduced by 0.2 cases per year, at an
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incremental annualized cost of $4.4 billion per year.'
This
corresponds to a cost of $22 billion per life saved, which far exceeds the
costs of previous EPA regulations.'s 6
A Wall Street Journalarticle indicates that a federal appeals
court threw out Labor Department workplace-exposure limits involving
the right to a safe workplace, because the 428 toxic chemicals were set
on a general basis rather than substance by substance.'
These
regulations would have cost employers $788 million a year and would
save 700 lives annually. This adds up to a per life cost of
$1,125,714. 158
Estimated cost for each premature death averted for the
Diethylstilbetrol cattle feed ban in 1979 was $124,800,000; and the
cost of the formaldehyde occupational exposure limit in 1987 was
$86,201,000,000.'
EPA estimates that the $6.1 billion spent on
cleaning up hazardous waste sites save 500 cases of cancer annually,
which is a cost of $122 million per life and may be less costly per life
saved if these estimates are forecast into the future. 61 There has been
no literature as to these speculative future lives saved in relation to what
the calculated costs would be. Yet only $100 million annually is spent
on combating radon, an odorless natural gas suspected of causing up to
20,000 deaths from lung cancer each year. The radon expenditures
16 1
come to $5,000 per life saved.
Riley Kinman, a professor at the University of Cincinnati,
teaches solid waste and hazardous-waste management classes.
Professor Kinman states that people's reluctance to allow a landfill near
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their homes is not based on scientific considerations but on unfounded
fears.12 One Cincinnati landfill produces 5 million cubic feet of
pipeline-quality gas daily, enough gas to heat 10,000 homes on the
coldest day of the year.' 6 3 Yet $6.1 billion is spent on "cleaning up"
these hazardous waste sites rather than targeting funds to convert these
64
hazardous waste landfill sites to energy producing centers.
Citizens often put pressure on Congress and regulatory agencies
to ban certain substances at any cost on the basis of fear rather than
knowledge. This basis is made vivid by a front page feature section of
the Louisville Courier-Journal. This section had a color picture of a
baby lying on its stomach and picking at a wood deck. The caption in
red letters asked Is This Wood Hazardous to Your Health?'65 This
sensationalizing of the issue causes hysteria and results in a
misallocation of resources.
The reduction of living standards associated with a $5 million
to $12 million increase in regulatory costs is estimated to cause one
additional death.' 66 Thus, ifEPA's claims about saving lives are correct,
the saving of one life may be purchased at the cost of many others dying
from, for example, a poorer diet. In response to these questions
Professor Elliott indicates that some economists place the $500,000
range as the point at which people have to pay others to put themselves
at risk in regard to a life saved.' 6 7

1. Market System Effects on Determining the Value of Life
In today's society there is a resounding call from the public for
more intense environmental regulations. The push for a cleaner, greener
earth started in the middle to late sixties and has gained steam ever
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since. The American people have become terrified of the harm that
industrial pollution causes to our land, water, and air. In response to
their concerns the U.S. government has enacted legislation that places
heavy restrictions concerning toxins. However, economists and
businesses would contend that a major problem has been created in that
the government acts to immediately appease the public instead of
seriously considering the costs in relationship to the benefits. A way to
measure the benefits of environmental regulations is in terms of the cost
of the restrictions per life saved. With our current toxic tort system, is
clear that our current toxic tort system does not maximize benefits of
environmental regulations.
2. The Business Perspective
When determining the value of life, the average person is more
apt to state a higher price than would the owner of a large industrial
company. This conflict arises because businesses are forced to pay
astronomical amounts to regulate the toxins they produce. It is not that
most business owners want to pollute the earth and kill innocent people;
they simply do not want to pay for regulations that are ineffective.
While spending money and resources to totally eliminate every minor
toxin may be the noble thing to do, businesses would contend that such
a goal is unattainable because of economic resources. It is becoming
clear that this limitation must produce a reconsideration of the
current environmental protection policy. Previously, the government
was influenced by "advocacy groups demanded that the government
protect the public against all environmental toxins regardless of how
small the risks or how great the costs."' 68 This attitude has produced a

current toxin control system that "costs the U.S. economy absurd
amounts of money per statistical human life saved."' 6 9 "The median
cost of toxin control program[s] is $2,782 million per life saved. This
cost is 58 times larger than the median injury prevention program and
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146 times greater than the median medical program."' ° This
discrepancy comes from the ignorance of the general public, which
wants absolute protection. Unfortunately, the money it would take to
achieve absolute protection is not available. The government and
society must realize the limitations of our economic resources and act
to find ways to eliminate programs that spend billions to save one life.
There are two schools of thought behind advocating the proposed
change in toxin control programs. The first is that the system should be
heavily reevaluated, and the money from programs such as chloroform
emissions controls that spend $99 billion a year to save one life could
be used more effectively to intervene in areas such as smoking
cessation advice to pregnant women who smoke and flammability
standards for children's sleep wear. These interventions have a cost per
life-year saved of zero or less, meaning that there are more years of life
saved than dollars spent to save them. It is becoming evident that many
potentially valuable and inexpensive programs are not being
implemented while absurd amounts of money are being thrown away on
ineffective toxic control programs. Tammy Tengs has estimated in her
1994 doctoral dissertation "that if resources were allocated to more
cost effective programs an additional 60,000 lives (or about 600,000
years of life) could be saved each year in the U.S. at no increased cost
to the public or private sector."' 71
The second line of thinking mostly encompasses the businesses
of this country. By reducing the stringency of some ineffective toxic
programs, businesses would be saving money. Two analysts at the
Heritage Foundation put out a recent report explaining how "greater
economic growth reduces deaths by raising living standards."' 72 They
cited the fact that "even the White House Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs says that one person dies for every additional $7.5
million in regulations.'' 73 While it is difficult to place a simple value
on life, this figure makes it quite clear that taking money from the
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Sam Walker, ProtectingEnvironment Can Hurt More than Help, HUM.
May 31 & June 7, 1996, at 21.
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economy by way of costly restrictions on industrial pollution can
actually have detrimental effects on society. It cannot be disputed that
the need for pollution control is imperative. However, businesses
would contend that the restrictions must be evaluated to weigh the
benefits they produce. According to the White House figure, over
13,000 (divide the $99 billion by $7.5 million) lives could be saved by
simply doing away with the chloroform controls and allowing
1 74
businesses to reinvest the money into the economy.
The government's initial plans to control toxic substances did
not take the question of costs versus benefits into account. However, as
more pressure comes from industry and economists, government
officials are beginning to take a hard look at certain programs. The first
steps toward a more cost efficient toxic control system came with the
changing of the Delaney Clause. The clause was passed in order to
restrict use of any cancer causing pesticides on produce. However,
businesses would contend that it has been proven that small amounts of
these substances are harmless, according to the legal elements of
causation. Technology today is such that pesticides can be detected in
very small amounts. "The zero tolerance standard seemed reasonable
when monitoring equipment could only pick up pesticide residues
of parts per 100,000 or per million, but present-day equipment can
detect traces down to 1 part per billion or trillion."'75
If the Delaney Clause had not been changed, farmers would not
have been able to use some of the pesticides that they previously relied
on. By lessening the restrictions the government in essence allowed
farmers the use of these pesticides, thus increasing their product yields.
Businesses and economists argued that the Delaney Clause was costing
farmers large amounts of money and saved very few lives. If it was not
changed, "Delaney would reduce the national competitiveness in
processed food sales and would result in higher food prices."' 76 By
reforming the Delaney Clause, businesses argued that the resultant
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increased profits will consequently help to stimulate the economy and
increase living standards.
The question of how to most effectively spend the limited
resources we have on protecting society is one that every business
is involved in. The current system of regulating industries is causing
billions of dollars to be spent on some restrictions that act to save very
few lives. Businesses contend that they have to convince government
that reforms must be made as to proper reallocation of this money.
The perspective of business is that the decision as to how to reallocate
these funds should be left up to the businesses, with the government
overseeing their efforts. Businesses feel that ifthey can more effectively
protect society through programs other than those already established,
then they should be encouraged to do so. The argument is that if
businesses are to reinvest the additional money, the economy will be
stimulated and more lives will be saved through this approach.
Therefore, the best way to determine the most effective use of resources
to control toxins is by the number of lives, or life years, that each
program saves. By eliminating the programs that spend large amounts
compared to the lives they save, more money will automatically be
freed up to put toward programs that more effectively save lives.
Now we have come full circle. Pareto-optimal is the point at
which people stop making buying decisions. 77
' If Professor Elliott and
the economists he mentions are correct, and people put a $500,000
value on the risk of losing a life, then any expenditure in excess of
$500,000 per life saved is not justified under the market system's
economic efficiency approach. We can also look at this issue from
another perspective in order to determine the value of a life under the
Pareto-optimal standard. In which situations in our lives do we set a
value on life? If we buy life insurance we set a value on life. If we buy
automobile liability insurance we set a value on life, since it provides
for injury or death to one person and also limits for injury or death to
two or more people. If we buy homeowners' insurance or tenants'
insurance, we purchase liability limits in relation to injury or death.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1138 ( 7 th ed. 1999) (pareto-optimal is
defined as an "economic situation in which no person can be made better off
without making someone else worse off').
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The life insurance policy usually deals with setting a value on
one's own life and/or that of a spouse. The automobile liability and
homeowners' or tenants' insurance involves setting values on some
unknown person's life. The concept that individuals should, through a
market-system analysis (what we are willing to pay), actually set a
value on a life is difficult for some individuals to accept, but that is
exactly what we are doing. The life insurance policy makes provision,
in the event of a person's death, only for compensation to others.
Therefore, the amount of life insurance a person takes out may be
interpreted as a reflection of the individual's concern for his or her
family. A bachelor with no dependents may have no reason to take out
life insurance, but must still evaluate the value of other people's lives
when securing automobile liability insurance.17
At what levels do individuals set these values and upon what
determinants does it depend? A survey of 63 individuals showed that
such values depend significantly on their income level and to a small
degree their educational level. This survey questioned accountants,
lawyers, doctors, nurses, an electrician, many blue-collar workers,
undergraduate students, and law students. The low side of the results
was zero for liability coverage on automobiles, even though the State of
Indiana requires minimum levels of $25,000 for one individual and
$50,000 for more than one individual. In this instance, the State is
setting a minimum on the value of life. The low for life insurance and
individuals renting without purchasing tenants' insurance was zero. The
low for homeowners was $50,000, and that probably was because
lending institutions require insurance. The high for automobile liability
insurance was $1.1 million, homeowners' liability insurance $1.1
million, tenants' liability insurance $100,000, and life insurance $2
79
million.1
In the second survey rather than a polling of individuals, a
survey form was created. "' The author gave this survey to 44 basic law
supra note 151, at 303.
179
Cliff Fisher, survey entitled InsuranceDatapolled from individuals during
month of September 1992 (on file with author).
180
Cliff Fisher, survey entitled Survey - Parent(s)given to students in two
basic law classes at Hanover College. Results were turned in to author on Sept. 29,
178
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students at Hanover College and required them to return it. Hanover
College is an independent undergraduate liberal arts college related to
the Presbyterian Church, and is located above the Ohio River in
Southeastern Indiana.
The students secured information from their parents in regard to
automobile liability insurance, homeowners' liability insurance, tenants'
liability insurance, life insurance limits for both their mother and father,
the age of their mother and father, and their parents' telephone numbers.
This second survey did not deviate significantly from the first.
The high for automobile liability insurance was $1 million,
homeowners' liability insurance $1 million, tenants' liability insurance
$20,000, and life insurance $1,925,000. The low for automobile
liability insurance was $50,000, homeowners' and tenants' liability
insurance was zero, and life insurance was zero. The results of the
survey are indicated below.
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE

Max. per 1 person
1,000,000

Max. for 2 or more Property Damage
High
1,000,000
350,000

50,000

50,000

Low

155,681.81
100,000

44

25,000

Average
325,113.64
Median
300,000

100,000

Number in Insurance Survey
44
44

Homeowners' Liability

Tenants' Liability Insurance
High

1,000,000

114,204.55

20,000

1992 (on file with author). See infra Appendix A.
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Low

265,963.42
300,000

Mother
55
300,000
36,000
48,427.95
25,000

44
Mother
Housewife
Part-time student
Factory
Admin. Assistant
Teacher
Sales
Bank/Acc.
Manager
Nurse

Average
6 ,666.67
Median
0
Number in Survey
3
Life Insurance
Age
Father
64
High
1,925,000
Low
33,000
Average
167,295.45
Median
100,000

Number in Survey
44
Occupations
Father
Stagehand
Social worker
Factory
Foreman
Distributor
Teacher
Sales
School Admin.
Management

[Vol. 9
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Bank
Armed Service
Private Invest.
Engineer
Doctor
CEO

1
1
1
4
2
2

Police
Fed/State
Research Asst.
Lawyer
Self Employed
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1
1
I
1
2

Why does society expend far greater resources to save the lives
of known individuals in present peril than we are prepared to devote to
measures that will prevent future dangers to individuals that are
unknown or not yet born? The expenditure of resources for individuals
in immediate peril has been shown in the long run to lead to a smaller
number of lives saved with the same or larger monetary expenditures.
Should the immediacy of an individual's peril of death create any
special claims on society to relieve that peril? Economists indicate that
the rational strategy is to maximize the number of lives saved. The
assumption is that the resources allocated to save a life should be spent
so as to maximize the number of lives saved or minimize the number of
lives lost. Rationality dictates that resources be divided between saving
lives and competing ends so as to attain the highest possible level of
benefit to society.' s So far, our government has been cost-oblivious.
Congress and agencies should look seriously at where dollars are being
spent, and that the total life-saving allocation of money should be spent
in a way that leads to the greatest number of lives saved in the long run.
If an individual compares the survey ranges of $0 to $2 million,
which were determined in the market, and the $500,000 economists
indicate is the value of a life to the government's cost of$12.2 million
per life for hazardous waste sites; $22 billion per life to retrofit coalburning power plants; $5.7 trillion per life for wood preservatives; or
the $100 million per life quoted by Donald Elliott, what conclusion
would a reasonable individual come up with? Who is to say whether $1
million, or $10 million, or $240 million, or $10 billion is too much, or
too little, to spend to save a life? Who can value a human life?
Individuals value different risks differently, depending on whether they
181

(1969).

Charles Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1415, 1415-1417
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are private or public risks. If it is reasonable to spend more money to
save a life when it is a public risk, then at least we need to determine
how much more and be able to explain why. Then we need to
determine whether and where the nation spends too much money to buy
a little extra safety when the resources available to combat health risks
are not limitless. At all times regulation imposes costs that mean less
real income available to individuals for alternative expenditure. The
deprivation of real income itself has adverse health impacts, in the form
of poorer diet, more heart attacks, and more suicides. It is estimated
that every $7.25 million spent on a cleanup regulation will, under
certain assumptions, induce one additional fatality through this income
effect; that a one percent increase in unemployment, sustained over five
years, means 19,000 more heart attacks and 1,100 more suicides over
time.
Where regulation involves large risks, this small
counterproductive tendency is irrelevant; where regulation aims at small
risks, these small negative offsetting consequences mean that a costly
standard that seeks to save a few statistical lives, in reality saves no lives
at all, on balance.182 Most likely the conclusion would be that
government has been cost-oblivious, that Congress and agencies should
look seriously at where these dollars are being spent, and that the total
life-saving allocation of money should be spent in a way that leads to
the greatest number of lives saved in the long run.
In regard to our concern for human life, less is actually being
done than what could be with the resources available. An argument
from a fairness perspective would indicate that it is sufficient tojustify
the choice of a particular life-saving strategy or regulation that leads to
the least net loss of lives in the long run.'83
An argument can be developed that people do not accurately
evaluate small risks, which would mean that an economist's assumption
of perfect information on behalf of the consumer is inaccurate, whether
the consumer is purchasing air bags, Volvos, smoke detectors, life
insurance, car insurance, homeowners' insurance or an airplane ticket.
Some risks may be so small that this assumption could be correct, but
it cannot hold true for all risk related purchases. If the reader is of the
182
183

BREYER, supra note 109, at 15, 16, 18, & 23.
Fried, supra note 181, at 1425-1426.
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opinion that the author's survey and the value indicated by economists
are not as meaningful as they would like, then let us look at studies that
extrapolate from how much consumers are willing to pay for safety
devices such as smoke detectors, automobile air bags, or the desire for
prompt coronary care. In principle, this
... method starts with the dollars consumers spend on

a certain life saving product or activity. That is divided
by an estimate of the life-saving potential of that item.
The result is the impliedvalue consumers put on their
own lives by their spending. A hypothetical example:
Consumers might be willing to pay $100 for a brand of
smoke detector that has one chance in 1,000 of saving
a life. Thus, each detector "saves" one one-thousandth
of a life. Buying of this detector implies a value of life
equal to $100 divided by .001, or $100,000.
Calculations in one actual smoke detector study were
vastly more complicated, of course. Risks somehow
had to be quantified and other variables held constant.
Once all the factors were controlled, that study
produced
an implied value of at least $373,000 per
84
1
life.
This theory has been used successfully by Chicago economist
Stanley Smith in a federal civil-right lawsuit in Illinois and has been
endorsed by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.' 85 This
theory, in essence, involves the offer/asking dilemma. It measures costbenefit by putting a dollar amount on what people will pay for an item.
There are two ways to approach this theory. In the first approach the
individual doesn't have the item and is asked how much he or she is
willing to pay for it. In the second approach the individual has the item
Paul M. Barnett, Price of Pleasure:New Legal Theorists Attach Dollar
Value to the Joys of Living - 'Hedonic' Damage Argument by Ecoonomist Stan
Smith Stirs Debate in Death Suits - The Worth of Smelling a Rose, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 12, 1988, at BI (emphasis added).
185
See State of Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
184
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and is asked what someone else should have to pay them for the item.
Cost-benefit analysis uses the first approach. The second approach,
when an individual already has the item, does not depend on the
individual's income; therefore the second approach usually has a higher
dollar amount attributed to it.
This offer/asking dilemma was used in State ofOhio v. United
States Department of Interior in 1989. This case involved citizens'
rights to natural resources and the D.C. Appeals Court dealt with the
issue by assessing damages for impairment of natural resources and by
determining the public loss under CERCLA. The Department of the
Interior and the court described this theory as the contingent valuation
process. The contingent valuation process included all the techniques
that set up hypothetical markets to elicit an individual's economic
valuation ofa natural resource. Economist Stanley Smith has taken the
application of this theory beyond natural resources and used it for actual
products or services. In the State of Ohio case, the contingent valuation
involved a series of interviews with individuals to ascertain the values
they respectively attached to particular changes in particular resources.
The contingent valuation methodology dealt with option and existence
values:
Opinion value is the dollar amount an
individual is willing to pay although he or she is not
currently using a resource but wishes to reserve the
option to use that resource in a certain state of being in
the future. For example, an individual who does not
plan to use a beach or visit the Grand Canyon may
nevertheless place some value on preservation of the
resource in its natural state for personal enjoyment in
the event of a later change of mind.'86
Existence value is the dollar amount an
individual is willing to pay although he or she does not
plan to use the resource, either at present or in the
future. The payment is for the knowledge that the
resource will continue to exist in a given state of being.

M6
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Though lacking any interest in personally enjoying the
resource, an individual may attach some value to it
because he or she may wish to have the resource
available for others to enjoy. 87
The Department of the Interior:
. in the face of critical comments,
"recognize(d) that the application of willingness-toaccept", formerly a factor in option and existence
valuation, "can lead to more technical difficulties and
uncertainties than willingness-to-pay." The conclusion
was reached that, as studies indicated, use of
willingness-to-accept--meaning an individual is to be
paid to forfeit his interest in a resource, as opposed to
the individual himself paying to preserve that interest-yielded disproportionately high dollar assessments.
For example, one study showed that actual payments
for goose hunting licenses were $880,000 while
willingness-to-sell was $1,411,000, and willingnessto-pay was only $293,000.18
The court found that the Department of the Interior's
promulgation of contingent valuation was made intelligently and
cautiously and the methodology was reasonable and consistent with
congressional intent under CERCLA. Economist Stanley Smith used
the same methodology, but rather than directing it to natural resources,
asked the question; "How much is one life worth?" Stanley Smith
determined a range of implied values of a human life, extrapolated from
what people pay for various products or services, to be as follows:
Basis for Calculation Value of Life

17

188

Id. at 476 n. 74.
Richard C. Bishop & Thomas A. Heberlein, Measuring Values of Extra

Market Goods: Are Indirect Measures Biased?, 61 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 926,929
(1979).

106

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

Desire for prompt coronary care:
Automobile air bag purchase:
Smoke detector purchase:
Seat belt usage:
Wage premiums for dangerous police work:

[Vol. 9

$68,000
$380,000
$373,000
$541,000
$850,000.189

Two studies, one by Robert Smith, and a second study by
Richard Thaler and Sherwin Rosen, examined decisions made in thejob
market. They believed that workers would have an incentive to acquire
decent information about work-related risks, and since risky jobs are
less attractive, the expectation is that after controlling for education,
race, experience, unionization, and region, wage rates will be higher in

high-risk occupations. Smith's study indicated that manufacturing
industry workers collectively were willing to forego $1.5 million in pay
ifemployers undertook steps to save one life. Thaler and Rosen's study
of 37 hazardous occupations had an implied value for life of
$200,000.190

The worth or value of a thing is determined by what a person is
willing to pay for it. It does not focus on how much an individual
would pay to avoid certain death, since most individuals would pay
almost all they could get their hands on. However, most safety and
health programs lower the risk of death, but we do not know who would
have died without the program. The preferences of consumers probably
are the best guide for government policy makers. The preferences can
be determined by looking at decisions that individuals make when their
lives are actually at risk as has been presented by polling consumers. 191
Mark Kelman provides a poll of middle-aged male students in
a business school cost-benefit course, the students were asked two
questions. The first question was: Suppose you have been exposed to
a disease that would kill you painlessly in one week. The probability
that you have contracted it is .001. There is a vaccine, limited in
supply, that will cure you iftaken now. How much will you pay? You
will have thirty years to pay, so problems of raising large lump sums of

190

Barnett, supra note 184, at BI (figures used are in 1987 dollars).
Rhoads, supra note 153, at 82.
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income are eliminated. The second question was: How much would a
person have to offer you to expose yourself to the same disease? There
is a .001 chance you will contract it if exposed, and no cure will be
available if you contract it. Ifpeople behaved as they must to verify the
Coase Theorem, the answers to both questions would be roughly the
same, although there might be some small divergence insofar as the
marginal utility of money declines. The answers, however, differed by
orders of magnitude for many students; for example, the same student
answered that he would pay only $200 for the vaccine, but would
demand $50,000 to be exposed to the disease. The students spent
opportunity income--the amount they could earn by agreeing to run a
.001 risk of contracting a fatal disease--very freely to avoid that risk,
although they spend little received income to avoid the same risk.192
There are two standard criticisms of using polling. The first is
that respondents may not be able to understand and give consistent
answers and that an individual's stated preferences and actual behavior
often differ widely. The second is the possibility that respondents may
engage in strategic behavior by understating or overstating their real
preference. 193

If Professor Donald Elliott's argument and Stanley Smith's,
Robert Smith's, Richard Thaler's, and Sherwin Rosen's surveys of the
value that individuals attribute to a life are relevant, then government
is not being cost-effective; and society's resources for reducing risk are
being poorly allocated. Congress and regulatory agencies should use
the Pareto optimal standard and determine what citizens, in essence as
consumers, are willing to spend to save one life. This determination
needs to be weighted in regard to the costs and benefits to society, a
need which is indicated in the extreme when government action involves
a cost of $5,000 per life saved for radon and yet a cost of$12.2 million
per life saved from cleaning up hazardous waste sites.
Annual risks of death in schools from asbestos are less than 1 in
10 million; removing all asbestos in the nation as a whole might save
between 1 and 25 lives per year, putting aside the lives of removal
Steven Kelman, Consumption Theory, ProductionTheory, and Ideology
in the Case Theorem, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 682 (1979).
193
Rhoads, supra note 153, at 81.
192
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workers placed at risk. The removal costs are estimated ranging from
$53 billion to $150 billion. A mid-range of $100 billion, assuming a
mid-range of 10 lives saved per year for 40 years, means an expenditure
of $250 million per statistical life saved over 40 years. Is this cost
sensible? These figures can be translated into a more understandable
number since automobile accidents kill about 50,000 individuals per
year. Imagine how much an individual would willingly pay for a
slightly safer car that would reduce automobile deaths by 5 percent, to
47,500 per year. Would an individual pay an extra $1,000 for such a
car? To spend $100 billion as a nation to save 10 lives per year assumes
we value safety so much that each of us would pay $48,077 extra for
any such new safer car. Perhaps Americans are more willing to run
private, voluntary, automobile-related risks, than to run public,
involuntary, school-related risks; perhaps they believe death, at an old
age, by cancer is worse than death, at a younger age, in an automobile
accident. If the estimate is divided in half, and in half again, the safer
car cost would be over $12,000, and yet compare airbags which cost
$200 to $500 per car and may save 3,000 to 10,000 lives per year. It
seems highly unlikely that the public would pay 24 to 60 times more
4
19
per car to save far fewer lives.

These costs cause higher prices for goods and services, higher
taxes, and socially undesirable consequences such as the failure of
companies to develop and introduce products that the public wants.
They also cause the wasteful and unnecessary testing that doctors
engage in for the purpose of avoiding lawsuits and the excessive defense
litigation strategies that attorneys and insurance companies use to defeat
even those lawsuits that are justified under classic tort law.'95
Just as an increase in the number of accidents and fatalities can
be a by-product of some growth in economic activity, so can a reduction
in the number of accidents and fatalities. Any expected loss of life or
saving of life, any expected increase or reduction in suffering, in
consequence of economic activity, is to be evaluated for the economy by
reference to the Pareto principle, by reference to what each member of
supra note 109, at 13, 14.
Stephen Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 795,
795 (1987).
194
195
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the community is willing to pay, or to receive, for the estimated change
of risk.' 96
Society judges many forms of activity, including government
action, like national defense, the medicare system, the space program,
the Food and Drug Administration, and the Environmental Protection
Agency, by comparing their costs of operations with their benefits. Isn't
it about time that society evaluates the value of a law and the classic
common law toxic tort system in relation to its costs and benefits?' 97
"Economists generally believe that health and safety regulations
should be designed to cure observed 'market failure'-- instances when
markets cannot operate efficiently to provide an effective level of health
or safety. Regulation is an attempt to cope with the absence of
appropriate market signals and to achieve more efficient allocation of
resources by directing them toward, for example, the reduction of
accidents, morbidity, or premature death."' 98 Many inconsistencies or
inefficiencies with our regulatory system contribute to this problem. For
example, often the issuance of regulations arises from a popular reaction
from a particular event, when, in fact, these should arise because
scientific evidence concludes that danger to human health and safety is
caused by a particular source that a regulation biologists would contend
that this policy leads to inefficient regulation that may cost millions and
only save .005-.006 per million people. They suggest that, instead, this
scientific evidence should undergo evaluation by other scientists. The
opinions and evaluations by these other scientists should be presented
in court, along with the scientific evidence. A change in court procedure
like this one may decrease the amount of inefficient regulation and
focus allocation of funds to regulations and problems which could save
more lives.
Stephen Breyer, a member of the United States Supreme Court,
suggests that because people lack understanding of the magnitude of
certain risks, billions of dollars per year are spent inefficiently. For

196
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MISHAN, supra note 151, at 315,318.

Sugarman, supra note 195, at 795.
Robert W. Crandall & Lester B. Lave, THE BROOKINGS
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example, risks such as asbestos exposure in school, only kill .005-.006
per million people a year, and yet the economy, government, private
corporations and taxpayers, spend millions a year in an attempt to
remove asbestos. Yet, government and businesses really are not
spending money efficiently because they are only affecting .005-.006
per million people. Resources could be allocated toward reducing risk
in areas such as long-term smoking, which kills 1,200 per million
people a year. While many expenditures on safety are obviously
effective and desirable, when it comes to certain federally-mandated
programs, such as, in the extreme, chloroform controls, we may be using
precious resources that could have saved more lives elsewhere. The net
cost to society to save one life through chloroform controls at pulp mills
is $99,400,000,000. 199 An economist would recommend a cost-benefit
analysis before enacting any regulations. The benefits should be derived
from scientific evidence that is supported by a majority of the scientific
community. If a considerable number of lives could be saved through
correction of a particular problem, then costs must be assessed. If the
cost of saving the lives is worth the number of lives that it will save,
then the regulation should be enacted and the cause or problem should
be eliminated. Considering a cost-benefit analysis, regulators would set
priorities and use them to govern the allocation of the agency's scarce
00
staff time and resources.
Before we go further, we must first consider the question: Is it
the number of lives we save that determines the greatest good to society,
or must we consider who we are saving? Is the value of life different
depending on one's race or income? Poor people and minorities bear
the brunt of environmental dangers from all kinds of toxins. At the
same time, poor people and racial minorities have the fewest resources
to cope with these dangers, legally, medically, or politically. Issues of
race, low income, and political disenfranchisement appear in cases such
as Poletown "where a poor but stable mixed-race neighborhood" was
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taken through eminent domain by the City of Detroit, to become a site
for a General Motors Cadillac factory."'
Residents of Kennedy Heights, Houston brought a lawsuit
against Gulf Oil, in federal court, contending that they, as racial
minorities, had disproportionately subject to pollution hazards. The
Houston neighborhood is where homes were built three decades ago
atop abandoned oil pits and where many people complain of cancer,
tumors, painful rashes and lupus erythematosus. Plaintiffs contend that
Gulf Oil covered up toxic hazards when the homes were marketed, in
the words of a 1967 company document, "for Negro residential
commercial development. 2 2 Many Kennedy Heights residents say
they would gladly leave if they could afford to do so, but their homes
are virtually worthless because of the publicity over the case.
There are different perspectives between government, state
verses federal, and business. A case in point relates to a plastics and
chemical plant that is proposed to be built in St. James Parish,
Louisiana. St. James Parish, population 21,000, is more than 80
percent black, and nearly half of its residents have incomes below the
poverty line. The rural area is known as chemical corridor and cancer
alley because of other industries already there, including eleven
chemical plants. 0 3
The state ofLouisiana backs building the $700 million plastics
and chemical plant. The EPA is investigating whether the location of
the plant violates Title VI of The Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EPA
also objected to the state-issued air-emissions permits for the proposed
plant and it appears to be the first time the agency has granted a
citizen's petition for review under Title V of the Clean Air Act of
1990.204
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disparate impact of environmental problems on a minority community
violates Title VI. The civil rights remedy was bolstered in a 1994
executive order by President Clinton that each federal agency shall
make achieving environmental justice part of its mission. While not
defining environmental justice, the order directs agencies to consider the
effects on minority and low-income groups. °5
The issue of health or value of life verses economic
development, in regard to the St. James Parish case, has different
perspectives. The proponents for and opponents of the proposed plant
do not fall along racial lines. The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference is for the plant, the local and New Orleans NAACP chapters
are against it, and the state chapters are neutral.20 6
A blatant example of the mingled effects of political clout,
economic resources, and racism can be seen in the following New York
incident. For a twelve-year period, officials assumed that a trashburning incinerator did not cause a health risk for residents of a
predominantly black neighborhood in Albany, New York. But less than
three weeks after the incinerator's emissions blackened the snow at the
nearby governor's mansion, the incinerator was shut down. Until the
day it closed, the plant burned approximately 350 tons of waste each
day, sending arsenic, lead, mercury, and other toxins into the air. It also
provided steam to heat and cool the offices of the governor ofNew York
and state legislators. 0 7
What about the indirect effects of individuals exposed to
environmentally hazardous substances, effects which might be a
contributing factor in their committing violent crimes that result in the
loss of life? Deborah Denno, a Fordham University law school
professor, conducted a long-term study of the biological and
sociological predictors of crime.208 The study showed that males were
twice as likely to commit a crime as females and for men, the strongest
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predicators of crimes were lead poisoning, low language achievement
and frequent household moves." 9 Dartmouth College Government
Professor Roger Masters's research linked exposure to toxic materials
and crime. 0 Masters found that violent crime rates on average are
significantly higher in areas with environmental releases of lead and
manganese than in areas without such pollutants.21' L. Buddy Gwin,
Vermont Law Professor and American Indian, indicated that if
environmental pollution contributes to crime, it is no accident that most
toxic waste sites are located in poor and minority communities. 2 It is
part of an all-too-familiar pattern, he indicated, going back to the
genocide policies ofLord Jeffrey Amherst, who distributed small poxinfested blankets to the Indians as a means of waging biological
warfare.2 13

For all of the above mentioned reasons, it is clear that our
current common law tort system is not adequately solving toxic tort
cases. We need another means of handling these types of cases.
III.
ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
CONSIDERATIONS AND APPROACHES
Richard Posner, in his book Economic Analysis of Law,
discusses three possible regulatory techniques designed to control
pollution." 4 These approaches will be analyzed along with a nontraditional fourth approach. All four of these approaches involve
alternatives that are designed to keep risks from toxins in the
environment as low as reasonably achievable, given the limitations of
scientific knowledge and economic resources. Alternatives will be
discussed, including compensation ofthose who suffer increased risk,
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in spite of administrative agencies' and risk-creators' best efforts to
protect them, by spreading the costs of the loss.2 '

The common law enforcement problem with respect to increased
risk is similar to that of consumer fraud. The individual injury may be
too slight to justify the expense of litigation to the victim, and hence the
victim foregoes the right to sue.216 In other instances, there is an
increased risk of injury or death, and that increased risk, caused by the
risk-creator, cannot be justified or related to a specific firm under
requirements of common law tort theory in order for the individual to
be compensated.
The principal transaction cost in this litigation is the attorney's
time. Other costs include expert witnesses, court costs, non-productive
lawsuits, costs to taxpayers (society) through the judicial system, and
other direct and indirect costs. These expenses of money, time, and
effort cause a negative impact on our gross domestic product in regard
to non-productive inputs to society, whether there is a vindication of a
meritorious claim or not. These transaction costs exceed the benefits
that a market could otherwise confer, and therefore it is worthwhile to
review the four regulatory techniques in order to limit the scope and
nature of these litigation transaction costs.2 17 The economic and social
aim is to minimize the sum of direct, indirect, and error costs associated
with increased environmental risk to individuals caused by risk-creators.
One regulatory scheme is for an administrative agency to prescribe the
specific measures that a risk-creator must take in order to avoid heavy
legal penalties. This approach requires the agency to have significant
amounts of information about the costs and benefits of alternative
methods of controlling toxins. Unfortunately, specifying the particular
method of toxic control discourages the search for the most efficient
method. In hearings before the agencies, hearings which lead to the
formulation of specific standards, the affected risk-creators have an
incentive to propose the cheapest toxic control method, regardless of its
efficiency, and to deny the existence of any more costly devices. Once
215
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the specified standard is adopted, the risk-creators have no incentive to
develop a cleaner or better process, since in doing so they would provide
the agency with the means to impose higher costs on them.218
A second approach would be to establish the level of toxins
deemed tolerable by society and then to compel the risk-creators, under
penalty of injunction or fine, not to exceed the established maximum
level, but to leave the choice of the method up to the risk-creator. In this
instance, risk-creators will minimize their costs of complying with the
emission standards, but the standards may be inefficient; they may
permit too many or too few toxins from an economic standpoint. The
solution to this problem would be to use cost-benefit analysis to set the
standard. This solution requires the administrative agency to have as
much information about the costs of complying with various standards
as the risk-creator has. It would eliminate the principle efficiency
associated with specifying the permitted level of emissions, rather than
specifying the specific toxic control that the risk-creator must use.2 19
A third approach is to control externalities by creating marketlike incentives through tax and subsidy schemes that encourage firms
and individuals to respond to marginal shifts in costs and benefits. 220 A
tax could be levied on toxins and adjusted in the same fashion that an
auctioneer adjusts market prices. The auctioneer shouts out the taxprice oftoxics. Risk-creators respond by stating how many toxins they
will emit at that price, and victims respond by stating how much they
would pay to reduce the toxins. If the victims are willing to pay more
than the tax to reduce toxins, then the auctioneer raises the tax. The tax
market equilibrates through a series of price and quantity
adjustments.221
The auctioneer always adjusts prices so that social value
increases, as measured by cost-benefit analysis. If government taxes
risk-creators for the actual cost of the toxins, then taxes and prices

supra note 214, at 352.

218

POSNER,

219

Id

220

Rose Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of Property Rights, 85

COLUM. L. REv. 931, 938 (1985).
221

Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, J. LEG. STUD. 1, 5 (1982).

116

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol.9

converge toward efficiency under the usual competitive assumptions."'

This approach is significantly different than the approach in which the
government simply taxes the amount of toxins emitted into or on the
ground, air or water with no relationship to market factors.
The government could print coupons and entitlements
authorizing the owner to emit one unit of toxins per coupon. No one
would be permitted to emit more than the risk-creator's coupons
allowed. This would encourage competitive exchange of such toxic
rights.223 These toxic rights would attract speculators, as well as riskcreators and victims, and could operate in the same way as the stock
exchange.
The state does not decide whom to entitle with these rights, but
instead the risk-creator, victim, or speculator has an individual property
right to sell or trade the entitlement. This approach is much different
from the traditional regulation of environmental hazards in which a riskcreator's entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not
permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller. 24
The auctioneer approach is "protected by property rights to the
extent that someone who [desires] to remove the entitlement from its
holder must buy it from [the individual] in a voluntary transaction in
' This
which the value ofthe entitlement is agreed upon by the seller."225
form of entitlement "gives rise to [a small] amount of state intervention
[since] the state does not try to decide its value," but it lets the parties
decide "how much the entitlement is worth [...], and gives the seller [...]
'
a veto if the buyer does not offer enough."226
There would not be
eligibility requirements on this right to veto. Instead, the right of an
individual to increase risk to others by releasing toxins or the right to
forbid the release of toxins would be determined by market forces.
This system of rights or toxic entitlements could come under
attack from a number of different quarters, chiefly by those who believe
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that individuals have the right to some minimum level of satisfaction of
basic wants, such as a right to a clean and safe environment.22 7 The
right of alienation of these toxic entitlements, as part of the bundle of
property
rights, may be in opposition to the rights of possession and
8
use.

22

Problems with toxic entitlements arise whenever two parties
interact. For example, suppose a manufacturer, a risk-creator, who
pollutes a stream, and the water users, the victims downstream from the
manufacturer, interact. Both parties, the risk-creator and the victim, are
the "but for" cause of harm to the other party. The water user could
have clean water if not for the polluter, and the polluter could spew
forth pollutants without
the cost of purchasing the toxic coupons if not
229
for the victim.
Both parties may argue that their rights have been violated. If
the water user doesn't have the resources to purchase the toxic coupons,
or the transaction costs are too high in relation to getting all downstream
water users together, then the water users will be harmed, since they
cannot secure the economic resources to outbid the polluter for the toxic
coupons. Holdouts, free rider problems, and information costs may
make these transactions practically impossible.230
Legal liability systems establish entitlements to determine which
party will be deemed the legally responsible cause of harm. In
economic terms, these legal rights rules force one producer to internalize
the external costs they impose on others.23' Therefore, under a liability
rule, if the polluter takes your right to clean water, the polluter must
compensate you at a rate determined by the court and/or discontinue the
polluting. 232 "Protecting innocent victims from socially useful risks is
one issue" while at the same time the "rationality of defining risks and
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balancing consequences is quite another. 233 Such consequences might
include the present generation being able to withstand toxic levels with
no serious health dangers, while "future generations may be faced with
despoiled hazardous, environmental condition[s]" they are unable to
234
reverse.

These toxic substances may vary in a number of different ways,
including
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

the length of the typical latency period from exposure to
the onset of disease;
the typical exposure route;
the state of scientific knowledge about the causal relationships
between exposure and disease;
whether the disease involved is rare or common;
whether the disease involved has one primary cause or many;
the value of the substance for economic purposes and the
availability of substitutes;
the availability of remedial therapies and/or control
technologies.235

Under the property rights rule, once the polluter purchases the
toxic coupons, the polluter will have the right to pollute with no concern
for the downstream users. The downstream users may contend that by
selling toxic rights coupons, the government is unconstitutionally taking
their property rights, and this action requires payment of compensation
if the polluting deprives them of the use of their property. The
government would have to determine if the payment of compensation
would undermine the reasons for the auctioneer approach rule in the
first place.236
In conjunction with the tax approach, some economists
recommend tradable discharge licenses. With tradable discharge
licenses, an agency could determine the total amount of emissions to be
233
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allowed in a region and then issue permits or licenses for these
emissions. The permits would be bought and sold as a property right,
like industrial property. Both of these mechanisms have an
overwhelming advantage over our existing system in their ability to rechannel self-interest to correspond with society's best interest. Because
permits are under control of the government in this system, emissions
become costly to risk-creators. They result either in higher taxes or in
tying up money in costly emissions permits. 37
The government must create exactly the right number of toxic
coupons in order to achieve efficiency and adjust the total quantity of
toxic coupons. The problem is that the tax and property rights remedies
will work only if the government agency behaves like an auctioneer. In
fact, government officials have little incentive to mimic the market.238
"In general, to set up an appropriate tax-subsidy scheme might require
as much information on the part of the regulating agency as would be
'
required for centralized decision-making."239
Nobel Prize winning
economist Herbert Simons contends that human beings and their
institutions have only limited capability to perform "elaborate
optimizing calculations; therefore, we make decisions by applying a few
standardized routines or 'standard operating procedures' and
determin[e] whether the results are satisfactory.""24 Developing a full,
rigorous central-planning solution to this problem would be a
tremendous task, requiring an overwhelming quantity of information
and incredibly difficult calculations. Economist Wassily Leontief won
the Nobel Prize in 1973 with an input-output analysis for an imaginary
economy with only three outputs. If the information could be collected
in a timely fashion, there is no computer system that could handle the
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several million equations that would have to be solved simultaneously
to handle this centralized decision-making nightmare. 4'
A. The Cost of Environmental Regulation
It is an accepted fact that some sort ofregulation is critical to the
preservation of our environment. The dispute between businesses and
the environmental lobby arises, however, when a determination must be
made about the extent to which regulation must be promulgated and
enforced. At least as far as air quality is concerned, the courts have thus
far, in suits filed by environmental groups against the EPA, decided to
support the EPA's position of a standard for the emission of air
pollutants. This standard reflects the degree of emissions limitation
achievable through the application of the best system of emissions
reduction (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the
administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated. However,
because the law is ambiguous in several regards, it allows for litigation.
Thus, many corporations have already contended that the regulations
regarding ambient air quality under the Clean Air Act and its
amendments are too stringent, and these litigants have enjoyed varying
degrees of success. Therefore, the question concerning the extent to
which the environment should be regulated is still somewhat
unresolved. Businesses would argue that the only concrete fact is that
the regulations imposed on them are costly to industry and ultimately
to the consumer.
Just how much are regulations like the Clean Air Act and its
amendments costing the private sector? Although it is impossible to
come up with accurate figures, businesses contend that the cost is
extremely high. Congress estimated that the 1990 amendments to the
Clean Air Act would cost private industry an estimated $25 billion in
lost growth, and according to Lawrence Kudlow, a republican
editorialist, the new regulations will cost as much as $100 million in
forfeited growth.242 Kudlow goes even further to say that he believes
241
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regulations like the Clean Air Act are a major factors responsible for the
recent growth decrease in the gross domestic product.243
Kudlow is not alone in his belief that environmental regulation
is becoming too costly. The National Petroleum Council, for instance,
believes that the costs of complying with new regulations "on clean air,
waste disposal, water, and health and safety" will cost the petroleum
refining industry approximately $37 billion. Offset against this figure,
the combined $31 billion value of the petroleum-refining industry's
facilities and the costs begin to seem exorbitant. 244 From a business
perspective, the cost of regulation for large firms is high, and the cost for
small firms puts them at a substantial competitive disadvantage which
could even drive them out of business. On the other hand, businesses
also note the benefits of the Clean Air Act, which according to the EPA
saved an estimated 79,000 lives in 1990 alone and saves $20 in medical
costs for every $1 spent on pollution controls. 245 Businesses also believe
that cost should be given even more consideration in the promulgation
ofenvironmental legislation than is already given. Businesses contend
that the effects of new legislation imposed in a non-gradual manner
may be detrimental to our nation's economic growth and output.
Nonetheless, the private sector often looks through a very narrow scope
and fails to realize the far reaching consequences deregulation may have
on our environment.
B. The Need for Environmental Regulations
Environmental regulations are needed to protect the health of
humans and also to preserve the essential elements needed to survive.
Regulating the amount and content of hazardous materials released into
the atmosphere, materials such as sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
carbon monoxides, ozone, particulates, radioactive particles, and lead,
can increase our life span and save lives. All of these wastes can harm
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humans in a variety of ways. For example, particulates in the air
produced by industries, cars, or gas mowers can produce asthma,
respiratory disease, lung cancer, pneumonia, and bronchitis. A study
completed at Loma Linda University compared the past 25 years of
particulate air pollution and found that 106 of 3091 exposed individuals
developed asthma.24 6 It has also been shown that 64,000 people may
247
prematurely die each year due to current levels of particulates.
Radioactive particles are also hazardous to humans in that
neurovascular, gastrointestinal, and bone marrow damage can be caused
by large doses of radiation.2 48 Radioactive particles in small doses and
over the long term can include leukemia, breast, thyroid, and lung
cancers. In areas of frequent exposure to radiation, the death rate
averages 2 per 1000 people.249
The environment encompasses all components of the air, water,
landscape, organisms, and topography. Among these components are
elements necessary for living organisms to survive. For example,
through photosynthesis, plants use chlorophyll, water, and carbon
dioxide to produce oxygen, the main ingredient for human survival.
Therefore, without photosynthetic plants, water, and carbon dioxide, no
aerobic organisms would exist. Over-exploitation of current
agricultural lands will lead to infertile soil. As a result, the human
population will suffer in that there would be too little food to support the
human population. When the population can no longer move to new
food resources, starvation and disease will occur. With the depletion of
essential elements, materials, and the environment, the world may not
be able to sustain itself. The public would contend that a solution
includes regulating the amount of matter entering into our environment,
recycling materials being used, and reducing the intake of food and
resources. A first step in protecting and sustaining our environment is
through education. With knowledge of the situation and the importance
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of the environment, individuals, along with regulations, can help protect
our environment.
There is no easy solution to the debate between business and
environmental interests, and there may never be a compromise that will
make both sides happy. It appears that the values of foregone medical
expenses and saved human lives are indeed great. The value ofa human
life will always be open to interpretation, differing from jury to jury.
However, given our society's Constitutional foundations and our high
valuation of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, the public's
perspective is that deregulation of the environment would undermine
these edicts. Thus, the issue of human life is at the core of the debate,
and because of its importance, the continued regulation of the
environment, considering cost to some extent, is necessary to the
American way of life.
The public seems to be of two minds concerning the
government's role in regulating environmental pollution. On the one
hand, most people believe that limiting environmental pollution is a
proper role for government. The market system is deficient in
controlling pollutants because it is not profitable for those creating the
pollution. On the other hand, there is growing skepticism concerning the
efficiency of regulations in achieving society's goals at the least cost.
This assessment of regulation requires that we look at exactly
what risks are faced from environmental pollution, the costs of reducing
the pollution and the benefits if the regulation reduces the risks. Based
on risk analysis, the performance of the EPA is extremely inefficient,
and such inefficiency not only costs dollars; it can cost lives. °
Synthetic chemicals such as DDT cause less than one percent of all
human cancer--far below actual public perception. Three of the major
contributors to cancer include tobacco, inadequate diet, such as
insufficient amounts of fruits and vegetables and an excess of animal fat
and red meat, and consumption of alcohol. Neither toxicology nor
epidemiology supports the idea that synthetic industrial chemicals are
causing an epidemic of human cancer. Such thinking ignores the fact
that most chemicals to which humans are exposed are naturally
250
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occurring and that the level of exposure to industrial pollution is
extremely low. 2 1' The perception is that lifestyle changes would be far
more effective than the often costly regulation of synthetic chemical
pollutants.
C. The Problems Associated with the Common Law Toxic Tort
System
The fourth approach is one that has not been referenced in the
literature. The rationale for the first three approaches was to reduce the
probability that individuals would suffer injury or death caused by
environmental toxins. Even if these other approaches are used, the
courts, under the common law doctrine of tort liability, will not
compensate an individual or individuals in regard to the causal link of
an environmental pollutant or toxin that causes an increased risk of
injury or death, usually manifested as some form of cancer, unless the
individual can demonstrate particular proof and unless the individual
can show the probabilities that the particular individual was affected by
the particular risk-creator are greater than fifty percent. This approach
is simply the common law causation and burden of proof under tort law,
which is extremely difficult to prove, and even ifthe plaintiffprevails,
the defendant may be judgment proof.
Common law toxic torts present major challenges to tort law and
the judicial system. The typical toxic tort case involves an alleged
personal injury and related harm resulting from exposure to a toxic
substance, which is usually a chemical, but could also be a biological
or radiological agent. Commonly in toxic torts, the injury is neither
traumatic nor an acute toxic response, but produces consequences from
genetic or biochemical disruption, whereby exposure is usually chronic
and repeated, and the injury manifests itself after a latency period.252
Scientists who expect a link between an event (exposure) and an
outcome (death or disability) have grown suspect of new theories that
borrow selectively from fact and pay little attention to the quality of the
factual material. The result has been a renewed interest in the scientific
251
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and legal requirements ofcausation.2 " The courts have been reluctant
to hold risk-creators liable until a statistically significant number of
individuals have been injured or until science has had the time and
resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies ofthe toxins. A
number of courts and tort scholars have suggested that as a matter of
fairness and equity, the common law tort probability standard of fifty
percent plus be relaxed when trying to prove causation.254 The
traditional doctrines of causation in common law tort liability require
a plaintiffto prove that, as indicated earlier, the defendant's conduct was
more probably than not both the "but-for cause in fact" and the
"proximate cause" of the plaintiff's injuries. Many lawyers who write
about toxic torts conclude that the common law tort causation doctrine
is one of the key elements that would have to be modified in order to
facilitate recovery in toxic tort cases. Guido Calabresi indicates that if
spreading of injury losses were the only goal of tort law, there would be
no point at all in requiring, as a prerequisite to liability, a causal link
between an act or activity and the injury. If spreading were the only
goal of tort law, then a social insurance fund should be used.25 '
What social value does the common law tort liability further in
the area of environmental increased risk? Does it advance desirable
goals such as compensation to the injured victim, deterrence of the riskcreator, risk-distribution, or a minimization of accident CoStS? 256 In the
utilitarian model, the essential function ofa tort system is efficient risk
management in order to reduce the social costs of accidents, that is, the
excess of accident-related costs over activity-related benefits which
involves cost reduction by deterring accidents and spreading accident
losses. The focus of a deterrence policy is essentially concentrated on
the avoidance of unreasonable risks, not the avoidance ofinjury. When
liability is imposed for actual injury arising out of unreasonable risk, the
supposed effect is to deter the creation ofthe risk itself. The present allE. Donald Elliott, Introductionto Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallaciesin
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or-nothing character to common law tort injury-based liability rules can
distort deterrence. They can produce over-deterrence and in toxic cases
under-deterrence where significant but not substantial risks to victims
go uncompensated. The present proof of causation in toxic cases, with
the emphasis on dominant causation under the "but-for" test and
deterministic relationships, can lead to the under-deterrence of
significant risks. The risks are masked by the confusion of multiple
causal factors, which the court requires to be measured only in
probabilistic terms. This problem is compounded for risks that do not
manifest identifiable injury for long periods after exposure. Long lag
effects escape deterrence because the errors are not detected and
corrected by the risk-creator until long after they are made." 7
The basic impossibility of proving individual causation
distinguishes classic common law toxic tort cases from ordinary
personal injury lawsuits. Population-based probability estimates do not
speak to probability of causation in any one case, and the estimate of
relative risk is a property of the studied population, not of an
individual's case. In most instances, cancer and mutations provide no
physical evidence of the inducing agent, so direct observation of
individual victims provides little or no evidence of causation.
Therefore, the risk-creator and victim must rely on epidemiological
evidence, which may become the centerpiece of classic common law
toxic tort litigation. Epidemiology is based on the study of populations,
not individuals, and seeks to establish associations between alleged
causes and effects by either comparing the incidence of exposure across
sick and healthy populations or comparing the disease across exposed
and unexposed populations. These scientific correlations lend great
weight to an inference of causation. However, in an individual case,
epidemiology cannot conclusively prove causation. It can only estimate
certain probability that a randomly selected case ofdisease was one that
would not have occurred without exposure or the increased risk of the
exposed population.258
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In an era of mass torts and multiple toxic agents, the link
between an individual defendant's actions and a plaintiffs injuries is
often difficult, if not impossible, to demonstrate. 259 No matter what
regulatory scheme is developed, civil injury or wrongful death suits will
continue whether they involve pharmaceuticals, food additives,
industrial compounds, pollutants, toxic wastes deposited in landfills,
radiation, or some other effusion of modem technology. The causal
linkages between toxic agents, exposure levels, and pathological
symptoms will continue to accelerate, pressing against the frontiers of
existing chemical, toxicological, and epidemiological knowledge. Yet,
the system of regulatory controls that has been devised for dealing with
many of these new risks is still very much in its infancy.26 °
For the common law to remain efficient, it must change as
conditions change. 6 Yet, it may be impossible to reverse past
precedents when changing economic conditions warrant such a reversal.
Precedents tend to weigh heavily upon courts even though rulings of a
century ago, say on questions of pollution, may not be optimal today.
If the bias imparted by precedents is too great, a change in precedent
may be impossible.262
A similar kind ofproblem arises when the costs and benefits of
a change in precedent are so widely diffused that no single party, or
group of [individuals], has an interest in bringing a lawsuit designed to
internalize those benefits or costs." 263 If we desire efficiency, there must
264
be a reexamination of the structure of the legal process.
Courts have the advantage of insulation from interest group
politics, but this insulation comes at the cost oflimited information and
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consequent bias in the development of rules. Legislatures and
administrative agencies have the advantage with respect to identifying
problems, researching them, and developing statutes or rules to bring
social behavior into line with goals of efficiency, but this advantage
comes at the cost of special interest pressures.2 65 Administrative
agencies are superior to judges in making risk assessment decisions that
turn on scientific and technical evidence. The case-by-case adjudication
through the courts, chemical by individual chemical, is inefficient and
expensive. A Rand Corporation 1983 study of asbestos litigation found
that over 60 percent of total costs were expended for administrative
costs, primarily attorneys' fees.266 A Rand Corporation 1992 study
indicates that, since the federal Superfund law was enacted in 1980 to
help clean toxic waste sites, insurers have spent an average of almost 90
percent of their Superfund related outlays on legal fees and related costs,
not on cleanup.267
When a victim under our present common law tort system files
a lawsuit, rather than obtaining swiftjustice, the victim often will wind
up waiting years before the lawsuit is resolved. Whether the lawsuit is
a toxic tort case or any other tort claim, the individual frequently will
come away from the experience far more frustrated than satisfied. Even
in a traditional tort lawsuit involving an automobile accident, the victim
rarely can expect to recover directly from the risk-creator who injured
him or her. Instead, the victim, if successful, will recover from an
insurance company. Compounding matters even further is the amount
that a victim recovers, if anything at all. The amount is unlikely to
reflect what an objective individual would say the victim truly deserved.
The relevant factors that determine the case outcome include primarily:
the talent of the attorney the victim happens to have; the tenacity of the
risk-creator or its insurance adjuster; whether the risk-creator happens
to be a Fortune 500 corporation, a small family business, or a
governmental entity; what type of witness the victim makes; what race
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the victim is; what state or community the victim lives in; how well one
is able to hold out for a larger settlement; the whim of the jury; and
whether the victim is lucky enough to have available acceptable
evidence of the increased risk or injury. Therefore, our current common
law tort system may not be considered a system ofjustice in many cases,
but a lottery.268
Given the large number of exposed individuals, rapidly
developing scientific knowledge, and varied and changing legal rules of
common law tort liability, risk-creators can be subject to enormous
unanticipated risks. Relatively few injured people get very large
awards, while most receive little or nothing at all. This inconsistency
is not only inequitable to the victim but is detrimental to society as a
whole. Uncertain and unclear application of the law diminishes the
incentive of risk-creators to act in a prudent manner when
manufacturing, selling, or disposing of consumer products. In
connection with the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein
commented on the growing problem that confronts the petro-chemcial
industry in its manufacturing of certain products that are of great social
utility, but which may have adverse consequences in a very small
number of cases. In addition to being slow, expensive, and likely to
choose the wrong people to compensate or to reject, the present common
law toxic tort compensation system has the grave defect of inhibiting
socially sound action by the threat of post hoc risk assessments that bear
little relation to society's overall needs. 269 Toxic tort litigation threatens
industry with enormous, unpredictable liability that might well
undermine economic motivation to engage in some socially beneficial
activities. It threatens firms with retroactive liability for risks that
organizations could not reasonably foresee.27°
Not only is there post hoc risk assessment difficulty, but the
transaction costs associated with common law toxic tort litigation have
hidden costs. The complexity of the scientific issues causes a generalist
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court to spend both significant time and money to become educated on
the issues, and thus other deserving cases are greatly delayed because
ofthejudicial resources being devoted to toxic tort litigation. Costs are
incurred in limited corporate productivity, since corporate officials and
other staffare mired in litigation and unable to devote time to corporate
business. There are increased liability insurance costs that translate into
higher costs of doing business, and in many instances, because of the
uncertainty of the liability risk, insurance companies may refuse to
insure the organization. Societal costs are incurred as socially useful,
but hazardous substances are discontinued by organizations in the
absence of available insurance or guarantees of limited liability."'
Wendy Wagner agrees that there are problems in the current
common law toxic tort system, which she attributes the cause to a
"science charade" that occurs as a result of agencies supplying false or
inaccurate information to courts in order to defend their agenda. 272 To
correct the problem, Wagner believes that a change in the rules that
govern these agencies should be made to require them to conform to
ordinary scientific standards. This change would be enacted by
Congress, and would require these agencies to completely separate their
policy decisions from potentially inaccurate scientific data. All policy
decisions would be required to be on good standing scientific
knowledge, and regulations would not stand if they were in any way
based on a policy decision.273
Upon analysis of this solution, it appears that, even though
Wagner has identified a real problem in the system, and has made a
reasonable recommendation for a solution to the problem, she has
missed the mark with that solution. Although her solution may seem
logical and a good way to go about the problem, there are places in it
that are flawed and render it academic. For instance, involving
Congress to the large extent and the manner in which she does is not
feasible. Congress is chronically slow to act, and they tend not to act in
a manner that will constrict the powers of the agencies. Also, if this
difficulty in interpreting science exists as she says it does, it will be
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difficult for the courts to decide when an agency has overstepped its
bounds under the new set of rules. For these and other reasons,
Wagner's proposal is good in theory, but not practical in nature.
D. The Proposed Move from Common Law Toxic Tort
Liability to Strict Liability
Our present common law toxic tort system is characterized by
several inefficiencies that present major obstacles to victims attempting
to gain compensation for their harm. One of the main shortcomings is
that the burden of proof rests with the victim who, in most cases, is
unable and unprepared to generate the means or the data necessary to
draw a causal link between their harm and the risk-creator's actions. In
order to mount an effective case for this type of trial, the victim must
have significant assets or a law firm that is willing to front the
tremendous cost that will be incurred. This system "is blind to the
realities of scientific uncertainty and corporate behavior. 2 74 More
lucidly stated, in addition to placing an unfair burden on the victim, the
present system also creates a disincentive for risk-creators to act
responsibly because it is not in their best economic interest to do so.
What can be done to mitigate these inefficiencies? Can the present
system be modified in a manner that will not only curtail its present
problems, but will also serve to attain the goals of tort law? These are
difficult questions with even more difficult answers. However, the
proposed solution that will follow in this text is a move from the
common law toxic tort liability system to a strict liability system.
Before the aspects of the proposed strict liability system are
explored and the benefits of its implementation are detailed, the actual
goals of tort law need to be identified. The objectives for which tort law
have been put in place are as follows: First, tort law should establish the
proper duties to be upheld by individuals and entities; second, when a
breach of these duties occurs, tort law should then act to assure that the
victims are appropriately compensated; and lastly, any tort law system
in place should have as a by-product of its actions a deterrence on
274

Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation:Notes Towards a

New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2117 (1997).

132

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9

relevant risk-creators. The present common law toxic tort system fails
to effectively attain these ends and thus, needs to be modified.
Under a strict liability system, victims would only have to show,
in some credible manner, that they experienced a certain harm that may
have been causally related to the exposure of a toxic substance. Then,
once causal relation has been established, it is up to the risk-creators in
question to prove that they are not responsible. This change in the
burden of proof will force the risk-creators, who can anticipate some
hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, to take a pro-active
role in their efforts to protect public interests. It is the risk-creators who
are in the best position to generate the information necessary to allow
appropriate compensation to occur; thus, an essential part of the change
to a strict liability system would be to create a set of rules that require
risk-creators to "develop and disclose information that is needed to
'
assess serious latent risks."275
This reversed burden of proving causation is not a completely
new concept. In fact, Sheila Jasanoff, an attorney who has published
several articles dealing with environmental tort law, cites Allen vs.
UnitedStates2 76 as an example of this shift of burden of causation. In
this case, plaintiffs "claimed to have developed cancer from federal
facility nuclear fallout, a by-product of nuclear testing," but the testing
was "found to be covered by the doctrine of sovereign immunity on
appeal., 277 Despite this, the judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
ordering that once plaintiffs could prove "they had been exposed to
radiation during the period of atomic testing and that the available
epidemiological evidence linked their particular form of cancer with
radiation,, 278 this was enough to conclude that radiation had been a
substantial factor in increasing risk of plaintiffs' cancer. The plaintiffs
were awarded damages unless the government could prove plaintiffs'
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cancer was not caused by the fallout.279 The judge, in fact, reversed the
burden of proof in this case.
Currently, risk creators are well aware ofthe difficulty potential
plaintiffs have in attempting to prove any wrongdoing on their part.
Thus, with the small probability of being held liable, they may continue
to engage in acts that create potentially fatal risks for society. True,
there is legislation such as the Clean Air and Water Acts already in
place that force risk-creators to act more responsibly than they have in
the past. However, more steps need to be taken, and a change in tort
law needs to be implemented which will establish a "meaningful legal
standard" concerning the risk creator's activities that can result in harm
to victims.28 ° These changes in tort law could make great strides
towards curtailing some of the inefficiencies that presently exist under
the common law toxic tort system.
Tremendous transaction costs are one ofthe main inefficiencies
that exist under the common law toxic tort system. This is due to both
sides conducting multitudes of different scientific studies for each of
their particular cases. However, if part of the new system includes a
meaningful legal standard that risk-creators must adhere to, then the
transaction costs and time that are presently being wasted under the
current system can be trimmed immensely. These stipulations will force
risk-creators to develop effective information gathering systems to
assure that they are acting in compliance with the established
guidelines.2 ' The chief objective ofthis proposal is to encourage riskcreators to engage in far more scientific research when it matters-not
to win lawsuits, but to protect society against the risks created by their
(risk-creators) actions.282 In addition, the hope is that these systems will
not only benefit both potential and actual victims, but will also assist
risk-creators in their attempts to show that they acted in a socially
responsible manner. These information gathering systems could also
help to reduce court congestion, which is another peril currently faced
by the common law toxic tort system.
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Unfortunately, many cases concerning common law toxic tort
liability take years to make it to the courtroom, and others never make
it because of the congestion that results when attempting to deal with
trials of this type. With so much scientific evidence and various
scientific studies involved, the establishment of any type of clarity takes
a substantial amount of time. Thus, cases can span many years. The
end result is very few victims having their cases heard and even less
actually being compensated for their harm. However, with the
implementation of the proposed information gathering systems, less time
would have to be delegated to the hunting, gathering, and establishment
of crucial case evidence because much of the relevant information
would already be documented. Information gathering systems are not
the only facet of a strict liability system that would work to alleviate
transaction costs. Under a strict liability system, common law toxic tort
cases would be handled through an administrative process as opposed
to a litigation process.2 83 This would not only combat the peril ofcourt
congestion presented by the current common law toxic tort system, but
would also alleviate the unnecessaryburdens inflicted onjudge and jury
in their attempts to deal with scientific evidence.
The use of an administrative process to handle common law
toxic tort liability cases under a strict liability system would encompass
the use of a panel of experts who would hear the cases. This would
allow for cases to be heard more efficiently, which would also create the
potential for more victims to receive compensation. The hope is that the
use of this administrative process would not only eliminate the long,
drawn out trial process, but that its use of the panel of experts would
also allow forjust verdicts. Presently, a lot of confusion exists when a
typical judge andjury has to hear a case concerning common law toxic
tort liability. These types of cases are filled with expert testimony and
evidence that involve issues, facts, and language that make virtually no
sense to those who play a major role in handing down the final
judgment. Thus, this confusion not only adds to the tedious trial
process, but it also presents the possibility of an inappropriate verdict.
The proper focus of tort doctrine has been characterized as the
Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation in
Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA L. REV. 627, 674-75 (1996).
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adjustment of loss based on a fact specific, individualized determination
of fault, causation, and harm.284 It is the opinion of the author that this
"fair adjustment," in common law toxic tort cases, would most likely be
attained through the use of a panel of experts and an administrative
process, under a strict liability system.
Early in this discussion, the goals oftort law were emitted. The
inefficiencies of the present common law toxic tort system hinders its
ability to accomplish these objectives. It has already been discussed in
detail how a move to a strict liability system would work to mitigate the
high transaction costs, court congestion, inequitable compensation, and
unnecessary burdens inflicted onjudges and juries in their attempts to
deal with scientific evidence that presently exist under common law
toxic tort liability system. 285 However, another goal of tort law, which
the present system also fails to accomplish, is having as a by-product of
its actions, deterrence on relevant risk-creators. A move to a strict
liability system could work to alleviate this shortcoming as well.
The installment of a strict liability system would make the
possibility of risk-creators being held accountable for their actions much
more certain. Thus, the hope is that this system would not only
encourage risk-creators to be more conscious of how their actions affect
society, but that they will actually make protecting society from
potential harms one of their top priorities. Under the present common
law toxic tort system, this is not the case because the risk-creators
realize that the burden of proof does not rest with them. Also, it is
extremely difficult for victims to prove that the risk-creator's actions
were the major causal link to the victim's harm. Thus, risk-creators
continue to engage in questionable practices because their perceived
potential of being punished for their actions is not very likely.
Hopefully, a strict liability system that places more responsibility on
risk-creators to justify their actions will change the prevalence of the
risk-creator's reactive behavior to harms that have already occurred, to
a proactive approach aimed at eliminating the potential risks that they
may create. The proposed positive aspects of putting a strict liability
system in place to deal with common law toxic tort cases has been
284
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detailed extensively. However, this proposal, like any other that
represents considerable change to the way things have been done in the
past, is not without its concerns.
There are a few major concerns emitted when discussion on the
workability of a strict liability system occurs. The first centers around
the cost. Opponents argue that the strict liability system will be too
costly because of the vast increase in the pool of potential claimants that
would result from its implementation.286 However, those in favor of a
strict liability system claim it will be less costly than our current
common law toxic tort system because of the money saved through the
move to an administrative process as opposed to a litigation process,
which will greatly reduce transaction costs.
The second major criticism concerns the difficulty in defining
the triggering mechanism that would be established to determine when
a risk-creator's actions should be considered inappropriate. Granted,
this points has some merit, but the establishment of this triggering
mechanism would be no more difficult than the perils faced by plaintiffs
in their attempts to prove their case under the present system.
A third criticism involves the "wildly different 'scientific
conclusions' reached by sister agencies or even sister departments of the
same agency at the same time under the same administration concerning
' Sometimes,
the carcinogenic potential of the same toxic substance."287
"these inconsistencies can even include the decision about whether a
substance presents a risk worth regulating at all."28 Given these
inconsistencies across the board in environmental agencies, it would
obviously be difficult to assert consistency across the board in our courts
with regard to the strict liability method for dealing with toxic torts.
Although the move to a strict liability system does raise some concerns,
it is the opinion of the author that its potential benefits outweigh any
potential costs.
The redressing of wrongs is one of the most important functions
of tort law, and the current system that handles common law toxic torts
not only fails in this regard, but it also falls short in its quest to perform
286
287
288

Eaton & Talarico, supra note 283, at 676.
Wagner, supra note 8, at 1639.
Id. at 1639-40.

2001]

CAUSATION AND THE TOXIC TORT SYSTEM

137

its intended compensatory function. The present system's inability to
provide appropriate compensation for victims could be justified if it
deterred a sufficient number of injuries." 9 However, the current system
in place fails to effectively accomplish either one of these ends, and,
therefore, needs to be modified. Most literature and reform measures
that have been introduced have focused only on improving the
compensatory function of the present system. 290 However, these reforms
not only had no significant impact on the current system's ability to
appropriately compensate the deserving number of victims, but also
failed completely to address the other inefficiencies of the present
common law toxic tort system. The transition to a strict liability system
would work to combat the various inefficiencies of the present system
and could also be made relatively smoothly by using the Workers'
Compensation system as a model. The employer tort liability system
(Workers' Compensation) has already been changed over to what can
be considered a strict liability system. This move was met with some
resistance at its conception but has proven to be quite successful. Thus,
changing the environmental tort liability system from its present
common law toxic tort liability system to a strict liability system could
be aided greatly by incorporating the positive features of Workers'
Compensation.
I suggest that a move could be made from common law toxic
tort liability to a statutory strict liability for toxic torts. This move will
provide industry with the opportunity to perform cost-benefit analysis
decisions based on the cheapest cost avoider. Industry is better informed
as to risks and alternatives than regulatory agencies, courts or the
injured individuals. Strict liability has equitable distribution effects,
involves cost spreading by the firms, and does not require that a
" '
governmental institution make a cost-benefit analysis.29
Under this scenario, the common law toxic tort system would be
replaced by a strict liability administrative compensation scheme. As
mentioned, a strict liability approach could use the approach of
Workers' Compensation as recommended by Judge Jack Weinstein, the
289
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judge who decided the Agent Orange litigation.
Workers'
Compensation could be used as a model, and its positive features could
be incorporated into an Environmental Compensation program.
In Stertz, the court explained the quid pro quo rationale of the
compensation system as the exclusive remedy for on-the-job injuries:
"[o]ur act came of a great compromise between employers and
employed. Both had suffered under the old system; the employers by
heavy judgments of which half was opposing lawyers' booty, the
workmen through the old defenses or exhaustion in wasteful litigation.
Both wanted peace. The master, in exchange for limited liability, was
willing to pay on some claims in the future, where in the past there had
been no liability at all. The servant was willing, not only to give up trial
by jury, but to accept far less than he had often won in court; provided
he was sure to get the small sum without having to fight for it. All
agreed that the blood of the workman was a cost of production, that the
industry should bear the charge." '9 2

Before Workers' Compensation, even if the worker won the suit,
a substantial portion of the judgment went to the attorney who had
accepted the case on a contingency basis. It was not unusual for the size
of the attorney's fee to represent fifty to seventy-five percent of the
amount of the judgment. 9 3

Employer tort liability law has been changed to strict liability,
and toxic or environmental liability could be similarly changed. Before
Workers' Compensation, the doctrine of assumption of risk applied to
the worker, in accepting employment, the worker voluntarily accepted
the risks ofthejob. The assumption was that the employee was paid for
such risks; therefore, no additional compensation should be paid for
injuries. The common employment doctrine states that one's fellow
workers are better judges of one's competence and fitness of fellow
employees than the employer. Fellow workers discovering lapses of a
fellow employee should notify the employer. "Should the employer not
remedy the condition, these workers should resign [...] and seek an
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employer who will heed their reports. In any case, the employer hardly
can be held responsible for accidents caused by fellow workers."2' 94
The doctrine ofassumption of risk asked questions in regard to
whether the employer had the "right" to impose risk on the employee,
questions which frequently made the doctrine circular. Emphasis was
placed on knowledge and appreciation of the risk and the availability of
alternatives. The cost-benefit analysis was left to the employee.295
In reality, the employer may be in a better position to evaluate
the costs and benefits of a piece of equipment, given the likelihood of
occasional employee negligence. The employer may know the
propensity to negligent use and thus be better able to evaluate a
substitute piece of equipment which cannot readily be negligently used.
The move to strict liability in employer-employee relations was not
based on responsibility or rights, but was similar to common law tort
liability in expanding to respondent superior and ultra hazardous
activity liability in the past, which was based, at least in part, on a desire
to accomplish better primary accident cost reduction and an increased
concern for the public welfare.2 96

The absoluteness of our language of responsibility or rights
tends not only to erase the dimension of responsibility from our
experience, but tends to erase the dimension ofsociality. This erasure
means that we have a weak language for the protection of what could
be called the social environment, be it the workplace, neighborhoods, or
communities.297
Assumptions similar to those made in early employer-employee
relations have been made in relation to individuals who suffer increased
risk because of the location of their homes. It has been argued that a
home close to a polluting factory is less costly than a home further away
from one; therefore, the individual has assumed the increased risk by
voluntarily living closer to the factory. In addition, arguments have
been made that the individual is the cheapest cost avoider. Yet, these
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arguments are difficult to justify since industry has better information
as to the environmental risks and alternatives than individuals, and also
because industry is better able to choose to avoid that risk by altering
behavior.298
Rights-based philosophy emphasizes the integrity of the
individual as central in any legitimate compromise between personal
rights and societal needs, such as the right to a safe workplace.2 99 The
right to a safe environment is similar to the right to a safe workplace.
The right if violated causes the violator to be strictly liable. This right
forces the violator to internalize the external costs he or she had imposed
on others.
The use of litigation to pursue social goals is well entrenched,
and yet under the common law tort system, it does not provide victims
with adequate protection against the increased risks to their health
caused by environmental toxins.3" Claims for financial compensation
for the deaths and diseases attributed to asbestos, Agent Orange, DES,
and hazardous wastes have challenged established concepts about
causation, liability, and compensation.3°' The common law tort rule is
based on the premise that it is unfair to require an individual or firm to
pay for another's tragedy unless it is shown that it is more likely than not
that the individual or firm caused it, but this principle no longer
captures the community's intuitive sense ofjustice in cases involving
toxic substances.3 °2 The basic objectives ofthe tort law are better served

if liability is based on risk of injury rather than being based solely on the
actual occurrence of a harm.30 3 It has been the courts judgment whether
to favor the interests of the individual or the interests of society. But
there are some sacrifices of individual rights that persons cannot be
expected to make for society.
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Proponents oftort liability might argue that those activities that
maximize utility must be exempt from liability risks and therefore serve
the interests of the community as a whole. Under tort liability,
questions arise about whether the court should surrender the
individual's rights to the demands of maximizing utility or protect
individual interests in the face of community needs. This choice does
not have to be the only one. Protecting the rights ofthe parties does not
require that the community forego activities that serve its interests. The
issue of liability could be decided on the grounds of fairness to both
victim and risk-creator. °4
We should ask, "What do we want from our legal system?"
There has been major tension between the common law tort system's
reliance on factual and scientific causation and society's desire that the
tort system serve ends unrelated to scientific methods, including
35
deterrence and the spreading of liability.
Focusing on the problems of toxins in the environment and the
increased risk to individuals should cause society to reevaluate what
role compensation through the legal system should play in an overall
social strategy in dealing with toxic substances, as well as which variety
of institutions available to the legal system is best suited to deal with
toxic compensation problems.30 6
The concept of strict liability goes back to Judge Traynor's
concerning opinion in the 1944, California Supreme Court case, Gladys
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Fresno.3 7 The argument
was to move beyond res ipsa loquitur and look to public interest. The
opinion indicates that it is a matter of public policy to protect the public
from dangerous products placed on the market, irrespective of
negligence. Ifa risk-creator causes a menace to the public, it should be
a cost of doing business. 30 ' The risk-creator is the cheapest cost avoider
and the best spreader of the costs. The risk-creator has better access to
information and in many cases may be the only cost avoider. Without
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this shifting of the burden to the risk-creator, there may be little
incentive to improve past practices.
Under strict liability, the cost of the deprivation ofthe rights of
the individual would shift to the risk-creator that causes the increased
risk. This shift insulates individual rights and interests against
community demands by providing compensation for injuries exacted in
the public interest. Strict liability can protect individual rights and
autonomy, but it cannot prohibit socially useful activities. Ifpromoting
the general welfare is the criterion for rights and duties of compensation,
then few individuals would suffer under strict liability. 0 9
Thus, strict liability would be an equitable way to provide
victims with the relief they deserve, while also rationally distributing the
responsibility for the victims' injuries among the risk-creators, rather
than having the gaps in traditional tort doctrines that leave unprotected
an entire class of victims whose real and substantial injuries were the
product of the ever increasing complexity of modem society.310 Since
liability is strict under Workers' Compensation, there is no requirement
that the employee prove anything other than an injury or illness was
sustained and that such injury or illness arose out of employment."
Under an Environmental Compensation program, the individual would
be eligible for benefits if he or she suffered greater than de minimis
injuries ofa type that some credible scientific evidence suggests may be
causally related to exposure to a toxic substance. The program could
even work in situations in which evidence does not permit matching of
particular illnesses to particular exposures. "In a world in which every
victim is in fact exposed to multiple factors that tend to increase risks,
the question of which one 'really caused' the injury may not be
meaningful." 3 2
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1. Claim Filing Under Strict Liability and Insurance Industry
Involvement Under Strict Liability
In order to make this Environmental Compensation program
work, the individual would submit his or her claim of injury or illness
to the insurance industry. The program would be set up similar to
Workers' Compensation, and industry by statute would be required to
buy insurance or self-insure the exposures. "Under present legal
arrangements, payments for most torts are covered by liability
insurance. Where they are not [covered] the loss must be borne by the
victim and/or his or her own insurer or the government's welfare
programs."3 3 Under the Environmental Compensation program, the
insurance industry would spread the costs actuarially across industries.
Insurance premiums would be assessed, based initially on estimates of
the percentage of the total costs of increased risk of toxic harm
attributable to exposures to a particular substance. The costs that
cannot reasonably be attributed to any substance would have to be
distributed throughout the toxic insurance premiums. There should be
no significant regulatory or court intervention in this process; thus,
transaction costs would remain low.
Courts are constrained to reach decisions only on the basis of
live cases and evidence before them, and these decisions come at the
cost of limited information and consequent bias in the development of
legal rules.314 This information restriction and the high transaction costs
of courts are reasons why "fewer and fewer areas of law are
characterized by a structure in which courts act on their own to make
law in relative isolation."3 5 The court's role should change as the result
of the rise in a variety of other active lawmaking institutions. Yet, it
seems strange that in the United States, it is up to individual courts to
provide essentially ad hoc solutions to toxic increased risk disasters
considering their social and economic repercussions. Three factors by
default have left courts to handle these toxic issues: "the lack to date of
313

Robinson, supra note 257, at 785.

314

Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L.J.

585, 615 (1992).
315
Elliott, supra note 5, at 1357.

144

BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9

an effective national administrative regulatory scheme capable of
controlling undesirable conduct by manufacturers; the absence of a
comprehensive social welfare medical scheme for compensating victims
of [increased risk]; and the lack of adequate state or federal legislation
controlling [toxic increased risk.]"3 6
The market should regulate the cost of the insurance to
industries. Since particular firms are better able to choose to avoid
costly risks by altering their behavior, they can directly impact their cost
of insurance. The deterrence of undesirable risks will be accomplished
by increased premiums charged by insurance carriers to risk-creators.
These changes will cause firms to do cost-benefit analysis in order to
determine ifthe increased risks to society are outweighed by the benefits
to the firm. This cost-spreading, risk-distribution, and cost-avoidance
would provide an efficient model. It would indirectly, through the
purchase of insurance, put the cost of the increased risk or accidents on
the risk-creator, and when it is cheaper for the risk-creator to avoid the
increased risk costs, the risk-creator would implement appropriate safety
measures beyond those required by government." 7
2. Regulatory Standards and Specific Coverage Under Strict
Liability
The regulation, through minimum health and safety standards
set by administrative agencies, would be used to limit risks to socially
acceptable levels. Standards would be based on the value of a life and
would be precautionary, aimed at keeping risks as low as reasonably
achievable, based on a balancing of the strength of scientific evidence
that a substance may cause an increased risk of harm, the seriousness of
the potential harm involved, and the cost of compliance.3"' Where
multiple equitable concerns such as deterrence and compensation are to
be accomplished, separate institutions such as regulatory agencies and
insurance companies are desirable to perform the separate functions.
"Each institution can then be tailored with a particular goal in mind, as
316
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opposed to trying to accomplish all the law's goals at once through a
single institution."319 Insurance companies would be required to pay
compensation in the form of: (1) medical expenses; (2) medical
monitoring; (3) total temporary disability; (4) partial temporary
disability; (5) total permanent disability; (6) partial permanent
disability; (7) survivors' death benefits; and (8) rehabilitation benefits.32 °
These benefits would be standardized by all participating insurance
companies and would be the exclusive remedy available to claimants.321
Statutes would provide the percentage of the average weekly wage for
disabilities.
Because the effects of certain exposure to toxic substances will
not be manifested for many years, and because early detection greatly
increases the probability of successful treatment, there are many
instances in which the periodic monitoring of the physical condition of
3 22 , the
a victim is beneficial. In Paoli RailroadYard PCB Litigation

court stated that, "the appropriate inquiry is not whether it is reasonably
probable that plaintiffs will suffer harm in the future, but rather whether
medical monitoring is, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
3 23
necessary in order to diagnose properly the warning signs of disease."
The court further stated that a cause of action for medical monitoring
may be established by proving that:
1.
Plaintiffwas significantly exposed to a proven
hazardous substance through the negligent actions of
the defendant.
2.
As a proximate result of exposure, plaintiff
suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a
serious latent disease.
3.
That increased risk makes periodic diagnostic
medical examinations reasonably necessary.
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4.
Monitoring and testing procedures exist which
make the early detection and treatment of the disease
possible and beneficial.324
In addition, under this system, a medical review panel would
decide whether medical monitoring would be appropriate. There would
be coordination with other disability plans, whether private or social
security, so that no more than a certain percentage of a worker's average
monthly wage is paid from all sources in order to eliminate incentives
for false claims.325 Under this program, there would be no awards for
pain and suffering, which is presently the case in Worker's
326
Compensation and no-fault automobile liability.
Worker's Compensation came out of a clear bilateral system,
with workers on one side and employers on the other. The no-fault
automobile liability is not a bilateral system, since the entire public rides
in automobiles. 327 Environmental exposures are bilateral between the
risk-creators, be they producers of industrial compounds, pollutants,
food additives, pharmaceuticals or haulers of toxic wastes, and the
victim.
There are problems of causation associated with increased risk,
whether they are the uncertainty about the risk-creator's identity,
uncertainty about the victim's identity, or uncertainty about the efficient
level of precaution. Uncertainty about the victim's identity can occur
when a risk-creator increases the risk of a disease above the background
level by negligently or intentionally discharging into the atmosphere a
cancer causing chemical. The issue is whether or not a particular
discharge was the cause of a particular victim's cancer. 328 Whether it is
benzene induced leukemia, pesticide induced aplastic anemia, radiation
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exposure, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield contraceptive,
diethylstilbestrol, bendectin, cadmium or asbestos, the causal connection
might be complicated by multiple factors which cause individual
Since the confidence intervals from
attribution uncertainty.
epidemiological studies are wide, scientists trying to prove a causal
connection must rely on data from animal bioassays and short-term
tests. Both of these types of evidence involve trans-scientific
assumptions when applied to humans, and the evidence has individual
attribution problems.329
3. Implementation of a Medical Review Panel
Rigid, simplistic rules would offer no solution to the problems
of proving classic common law toxic tort causation. Only a flexible
approach which fosters a case-by-case adaptation to the unique nature
ofthe toxic, victim, and risk-creator is appropriate. A system with the
ability to provide appropriate deterrents to harmful risk-creator conduct
and to compensate victims is necessary. It is important that there be a
fair forum, with known and consistent rules available for both the
vindication of the victim and risk-creator's rights. Also, administrative
costs should be minimized and exorbitant expenses discouraged. 33' The
Environmental Compensation program would be such a system. The
premiums charged by insurance companies would function as a
deterrent to risk-creators and a fair administrative forum would be
created by statute. Just as the state of Indiana created under its Medical
Malpractice Act a medical review panel, by statute, under the
Environmental Compensation program, a medical review panel would
be created.
For this plan to work, there must be a coordination of experts
who are familiar with more than only one discipline. This panel of
experts must create trust, whether it is in the victim, risk-creators,
government, or the insurance industry. When creating solutions, the
329
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panel members must reflect an understanding of and sensitivity to the
likely reactions, the points of view, perspectives, and the difficulties
involved in their decisions. This panel of experts would consist of
scientists, such as epidemiologists and toxicologists, physicians,
economists, and lawyers. This panel would consider the available
evidence and reach a conclusion about the toxic increased risk
connection. If a connection exists, the panel could recommend full
compensation for the victim. If the connection is more uncertain, the
panel could decrease the compensation available to the victims or
tighten eligibility criteria. The compensation would be graded
according to the width of the confidence intervals. The medical review
panel would broaden the range of evidence accepted on causation
issues. Since no evidence in toxic torts can speak directly to individual
causation, the victim and risk-creator would be allowed to introduce
many types of evidence, including animal and in vitro experiments,
epidemiological data, and analogous medical cases, with the medical
review panel members free to decide which of the many inferences
urged on them were reasonable and free to reject truly irrelevant
evidence.
In many toxic cases, all the evidence is indirect, making
irrelevance extremely difficult to determine. The relevance requirement
would not be used to exclude potentially useful evidence. The
balancing of credibility of evidence is a uniquely appropriate role for
fact finders such as a medical review panel on a case-by-case basis.33 '
Using this evidence, the medical review panel would specify exposure
criteria, latency periods, and a list of diseases caused by particular
substances. Using notions of attributable fractions from epidemiology
and other evidence, the panel could develop fractions of total
compensation based on the probability of increased risk.332
Allowing risk-based liability imposes loss bearing responsibility.
The risk-creator is made to bear the burden ofthe expected losses; yet,
once that risk has been identified with sufficient clarity to permit
evaluation, the victim may choose to bear it because he or she is best
able to monitor the risk and take appropriate steps to reduce its scope.
331
332
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The victim may choose to file an Environmental Compensation claim
at any time after exposure, including the time of actual injury, with the
statute of limitation running from the manifestation of the injury.
Actions by victims would presumably be brought only by victims who
perceive a significant advantage from filing early and who are content
with probabilistic compensation. This plan would provide victims the
opportunity to pursue recovery for risk if they prefer to wait and seek
compensation for actual injury. Claims could be reviewed on the basis
of evidence closer in time to the underlying events, and the longer the
delay between filing the claim and the principal events, the greater the
loss of evidence, and the higher the chance of error.333 The medical

review panel would discount the compensation by the lack of
probability that the disease was caused by the increased risk.
An example of the proportional liability approach could be a
situation in which there is only a thirty percent probability that the
victim's cancer was attributable to a particular product or exposure and
only a forty-five percent chance that the risk-creator produced the
product or exposure. If the victim, under the Environmental
Compensation program, could show one hundred percent of the injury
or increased risk was attributable to the particular product or exposure,
then the compensation consisting of medical expenses, disability,
rehabilitation, etc., would be worth $750,000. The compensation of
benefits for this particular victim would be .30 X .45 X $750,000 =
$101,250.11 4 "A smoker exposed to benzene and dying of lung cancer
would recover less than an otherwise identical non-smoker. How much
less would depend on the medical review panel's overall evaluation of
the case. 335 The medical review panel would provide a source of
unbiased expert opinion that would assist the insurance industry in the
consideration of increased risk toxic causation.
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4. Replacing Common Law Causation with Proportional
Liability

Proportional liability would replace the common law causation
of greater than fifty percent. Proportional liability holds the risk-creator
liable for the increased risk and for the losses of each victim of disease
in the exposed population discounted by the probability that the riskcreator's hazardous activity was the cause. Proportional liability lessens
fairness concerns because risk-creators only pay for the increased risk
or injury their hazardous activity has caused. If the risk-creator, under
conditions of uncertainty, were required to pay full compensation to
victims, there would be an inequitable burden placed upon the riskcreator, since it would provide a windfall upon all victims by
disregarding the chance that they either harmed themselves by smoking,
drinking, or were harmed by some other background factor that the riskcreator is not responsible for.336

There will be degrees of uncertainty in regard to the effects of
toxic exposures and background factors, but uncertainty is no reason to
reject this proportional liability approach. Uncertainty can be taken into
account by discounting the recovery according to the degree of
confidence expressed in the estimates used by the medical review
panel.

337

In rejecting the all-or-nothing approach of common law tort
liability, it is immaterial that the probability of causation for a given
victim fails to exceed fifty percent. The change to proportional liability,
with no threshold probability, will increase deterrence since it no longer
will be possible for risk-creators to misuse toxic agents and still be
exempted from responsibility for the harm they cause. There should be
no threat of over deterrence from liability tailored strictly to the
increased risk and injury caused by the risk-creator's activity.338
In market share liability cases, the courts have in some cases
permitted the victim to recover for injuries without identifying the party
who caused the harm. The adoption of probable causation served to
336
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balance the victim's burden of establishing causation-in-fact, while
reducing the defendants' liability to only their calculated market
shares.33 9 The market share theory of liability originated in California
34 ° The plaintiff, on behalf of herself
in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.
and other women, similarly situated alleged personal injuries including
cancer as a result of ingesting diethylstilbestrol (DES) but was unable
to identify the manufacturer of the DES she had ingested. The court
held that where all defendants produced a drug from an identical
formula and the manufacturer of the DES who actually caused the
plaintiffs injuries cannot be identified through no fault ofthe plaintiff,
the plaintiff may proceed against all defendants. The market share
liability theory applies only where a single product is alleged to have
caused the plaintiffs injury and the plaintiff has sued a sufficient
number of defendants who comprise a substantial share of a specific
market. Under these circumstances, the burden of proof is shifted to the
defendants to demonstrate that they could not have made the drug that
injured the plaintiff.34 ' If that showing cannot be made, then the
defendant shares in the industry's liability to the plaintiff on the basis of
its market share. This case is similar to how the insurance industry
under the Environmental Compensation program would determine
premium charges for firms and for particular industries in relation to
injuries or increased risk from toxins.
Genuine mass toxic torts, such as the DES cases, possess some
or all ofthe following features: (1) geographically widespread exposure
to potentially harmful agents that (2) affects a large or indeterminate
number of plaintiffs, (3) possibly over long time periods, even
generations, (4) in different ways such that (5) there is difficulty in
establishing a general theory of causation and (6) an inability to link a
particular defendant's actions to a particular plaintiffs injuries or
increase risk, as well as (7) difficulty in determining the number of
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potentially responsible defendants and (8) in determining their relative
culpability, if any, which often results in (9) multiple litigations that
burden the courts and cause huge transactional costs, including heavy
legal fees, and (10) which threatens the financial ability of many
companies or of whole industries to respond to traditional damage
awards.

342

Our political system has given primary responsibility to the
courts and state legislatures to establish practicable and just rules for
compensatory toxic tort victims. The federal and state courts have bent
traditional substantive rules of tort law through doctrinal innovations
such as market share liability, enterprise, and concerted action.343 Yet,
many courts have flatly rejected the increased risk theory.344
An objection to recovery for risk is that it both over and under
compensates real loss. If the future risk does not materialize, then the
victim's recovery would be a windfall, but it would be one that
accurately reflects the burden ofrisk. The windfall so created must be
set against the windfall to the risk-creators under the present common
law toxic tort system by escaping all liability for tortiously creating
risks that did not result in injury. Under this system victims who
recover probabilistic harms early on would not recover full damages
once injury occurs, and it does not follow that no damages should be
given to all victims for the uncertainty they must bear for the riskcreator's conduct. 345 "The imposition of liability on manufacturers of
prescription drugs and other toxic substances based solely on
epidemiological evidence of causal links between those products and the
[victims'] injuries"34' 6 was a shifting of costs of injury to those parties
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who were in a better position than the victim to absorb the loss. 347 The
market share liability is similar to the proposed Environmental
Compensation program but is without all of the court-related transaction
costs.
A traditional common law toxic tort argument against an
Environmental Compensation program would be the example of a
driver who careens down a crowded street but does not hit anyone. The
driver is subject to criminal prosecution but is not liable to a person who
was not hit. This exposure of the possibility of being hit by the driver
has ended, and there is no life threatening residue remaining. This one
time contact with risk has no physical lingering effects on the
individual's body, which is quite the opposite of exposure to toxins.348
E. Argument for Class Action Suits vs. Strict Liability System
The argument may be raised that if efficiency is a goal, then all
toxic tort cases should be certified as class action lawsuits, rather than
replacing the common law tort system for toxins in an Environmental
Compensation program. Class actions have been used in catastrophic
toxic tort cases, but in the normal case, toxicological effects relate to
chronic exposure, and each cause of action contains different legal
elements and requires proof of different facts by each individual victim.
Trial rules for class actions require that common issues of law or fact
must predominate over matters that are individual to each class member
and that class treatment is the superior method of adjudicating the
dispute in order to have a class certified.349

The party seeking to establish a class action bears the burden of
proving that the elements necessary for class action certification exist.
Those elements are set forth in Federal Trial Rule 23 and Indiana Rules
of Court Trial Rule 23. The party seeking certification must satisfy all
four of the requirements ofTrial Rule 23(A): One or more members of
347
348
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a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only
if:
(1)
the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is
impracticable;
(2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
(3)
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4)
the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
If all four of these elements are satisfied, the party seeking
certification must additionally demonstrate the satisfaction of one or
more of the sub-categories of Trial Rule 23(B):
Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as
a class action ifthe prerequisites of subdivision (A) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1)

(2)

(3)

the prosecution of separate actions by or againstindividual
members of the class would create a risk of:
(a)
consistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members ofthe class which would establish
incompatible standard of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(b)
adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of
the interest of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members ofthe class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
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other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy ....
0
The primary basis on which plaintiffs in toxic tort cases have
sought class action certification is Trial Rule 23(B)(3). Although a few
such classes have been certified, most courts have refused to certify a
plaintiff class, at least with respect to increased risk and personal injury.
As a general proposition, the courts have held that class actions are
generally not appropriate even in mass tort situations. The Federal
Rules Advisory Committee stated in its notes on the 1966 amendments
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23:
A 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous
persons is ordinarily not appropriate for class action
because ofthe likelihood that significant questions, not
only of damages but of liability and defenses to
liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in
different ways. In these circumstances actions
conducted nominally as class actions would degenerate
in practice into multiple lawsuits tried .35'

Even where the relationship between exposure to a particular
substance and the development of an adverse health effect causally
related to that exposure is well established, the courts have been
reluctant to certify plaintiff classes.352
In cases involving exposure to toxic substances released into the
environment, the courts have generally denied class action status.353

Many of these cases involved claims ofpersonal injury resulting from
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exposure to chemicals in various products or chemicals that were
leaking from a landfill and are thus fairly typical of toxic tort cases. In
most toxic tort cases, the purported class issues cannot be resolved
without extensive inquiry into individualized, non-common factual and
legal questions. Such proof would necessarily involve presentation of
evidence by each member of the class. Such individualized
presentations have little place in a class action lawsuit. 54
The primary cases in which class action status was granted are
In re Agent Orange ProductLiability Litigation355 and In re Three
Mile IslandLitigation56 These cases are both somewhat unusual. The
Three Mile Island Litigation involved a single incident with an
identifiable source of exposure of a known, measured dangerous
substance to an identifiable and geographically limited group of
people.357 Even with these certainties, the court that certified that class
has indicated upon reconsideration that certification was really not
appropriate.
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The Agent Orangelitigation was recognized as extraordinary
both by the trial court and the Second Circuit, which stated: "This action
is 'sui generis, and national in its proportions' involving an
extraordinary consultation of facts, parties, and pleadings. 359 One of the
major factors on which the court based its decision to certify a class in
the Agent Orange case was the fact that the primary defense in that
litigation was the "government contract" defense. The defendants
claimed that since the product was manufactured under contract to the
government specifications, the private defendants were therefore
relieved from liability. Even under these circumstances, the court noted
that it was treating the case before it as an exception to the general rule
that mass tort situations do not generally lend themselves to class action

354

Breedlove v. Ohio Dep't of Transp., 62 Ohio Misc. 2d 298, 316 (1991).

In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984).
In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
357
In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. at 433.
358
Kuhn v. Skyline Corp., C.A. 83-0942, Toxic Chemical Litigation Report.
(Andrews) 2003 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 1984).
359
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 745 F.2d at 161 (citing In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation).
355
356

2001]

CAUSATION AND THE TOXIC TORT SYSTEM

157

treatment. Courts have refused to certify classes in multiple claim
product liability cases because the facts determining liability, causation,
and damages differ from claimant to claimant.36 ° Individual proof and
fact-finding are required to adjudicate each class member's claim. It is
the individualized proof, involving exposure and background factors,
required to determine if any given class member is entitled to recover,
which differentiates the normal toxic case from the securities and singleevent cases. If class actions for toxic torts were certified, the result
would be a multitude of individual mini-trials, which render class
treatment unmanageable and not the superior method for resolution of
toxic disputes.36 '
Class action lawsuits can involve members of multi-states.
There are substantial constitutional questions in asserting jurisdiction
over class members from different states. The United States Supreme
Court has held that even if initial questions of jurisdiction can be
satisfied in the individual case, the forum state must ascertain and apply
the choice of law and substantive law rules of the state having principal
contact with each nonresident class member.3 62 This requirement means
that if a court attempts to assert jurisdiction over nonresident class
members, it may not apply one state's law to all claims, but rather will
have to ascertain and apply the law of each state to its own residents.
It is apparent that this would be a difficult if not impossible task and is
inconsistent with making class treatment a manageable endeavor or the
superior method for resolving the dispute.
It is very clear as a matter of law and common logic that class
certification must accomplish some legally recognized benefit such as
judicial economy or efficiency of resolution. Nothing of benefit would
be accomplished by class certification under the circumstances of toxic
claims, except for some single--even catastrophic--claims, because the
adjudication of any representative claim would prove nothing as to
whether or not any other class member was entitled to recover. Even if
one or more of the named individual victims were found entitled to a
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recovery against the risk-creator, this would not mean that any other
class member was entitled to recover.
The right to recover can only be determined after the finder of
fact hears the facts and ascertains the law applicable to the individual
claimant. Since the facts which will determine the outcome of any
claim differ from person to person as to both liability and causation, and
the law to be applied to the facts is different from state to state, no legal
or practical benefits occur as a result of class certification. In fact, the
only potential benefit which could conceivably result would be
generating fees for attorneys. I submit that creating opportunities for
obtaining attorney fees is not justification for certifying a class.
F. Implementation at State Levels
Both the foundation of our country and the Constitution
emphasize the protection of individual rights.363 In recent years,
Congress has poured forth a stream of consumer and environmental
legislation designed to protect the rights of the individual. 3" The
relative strength of the states to protect individual rights has been
slipping away as the federal government has extended power over more
areas. 65 This encroachment of central national power provides for
consistent application of statutes but does not take into account the
differences between citizens of individual states. The federal
application of statutes does not provide the advantage gained when the
states experiment with different methods and models of applying strict
liability. Therefore, I recommend that the people of each state be
responsible for the content of the rules of law and that the
Environmental Compensation program be designed for the specific
benefit of the people of each state, so long as it does not adversely
impact the Commerce Clause.
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The statutory benefits will need to be reviewed by the
legislatures on a regular basis so that they will provide realistic
incentives to industry to evaluate costs and benefits and thus to continue
to reduce risks to society. This compensation program will have lower
administrative costs and should induce an increased number of claims,
which is a correction of a misallocation caused by the higher
administrative costs of the common law tort system.366 This proposal
may appear to simply be another social program designed to impose
additional costs on industry, but if designed correctly and coordinated
with other programs, it should reduce duplication of compensation and
costs associated with corporate and individual medical insurance
programs, Medicare, Medicaid, Workers' Compensation, Social
Security disability, private disability, and product liability insurance.
There is growing support in Oregon and Kentucky for a 24-hour
coverage, a concept in which health and workers' compensation
insurance are combined to avoid duplication and save money. No state
has implemented the comprehensive 24-hour coverage program, but
some are experimenting with legislation that allows companies to use
it. Oregon Insurance Commissioner Gary Weeks indicates that the "24hour coverage would eliminate much of the litigation aimed at
determining whether an injury occurred on the job. ' 3 67 The
Environmental Compensation program would be similar to the proposed
24-hour coverage but would tie together all the different types of
medical and disability programs into one, thus significantly reducing
transaction costs, duplication, and fraud.
Conclusion
The task of establishing causation is a particularly severe
problem when it comes to toxic substances. Many types of diseases
caused by a toxic material are also caused by other environmental or
non-environmental factors. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
distinguish chemical-related diseases from the natural background
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incidence of the same kind of disease or to determine whether the
increased risk from exposure resulted in any adverse health impact.
This difficulty raises the fundamental question of whether or not the
common law tort system is equipped to decide cases involving claims
of increased risk or disease allegedly caused by exposure to hazardous
substances.368
The present common law tort system may be efficient and may
promote the correct result in the vast majority of cases, but not in toxic
tort cases. Toxic tort cases have furnished evidence that the present tort
system is incapable of effecting justice in an efficient, streamlined
manner, just like earlier in our country's history when the pace of
advancing technology began to outstrip our cumbersome tripartite
government's ability to keep up with it. At that time, a new type of
government structure began to emerge: the administrative agency
designed to specialize in a particular field. Just as the administrative
agency emerged to keep pace with advancing technology, so should the
Environmental Compensation program, since the common law tort
concepts ofcompensation, deterrence, and retributive justice have not
been effective in toxic tort cases and have been called into question by
both plaintiffs and defendants.369
If the common law tort system can find no means to incorporate
incentives for prudent behavior and care in toxic tort situations, a
primary reason for applying common law tort to these cases vanishes.
Assessing the changing nature of scientific knowledge and the variation
in the state of the law, a system that is directed at providing incentives
for care may not be as appropriate in toxic tort cases as it would be in
automobile accident case or the slip and fall cases.3 7 °
The major arguments against the present common lawtoxic tort
system are that traditional litigation for toxins is too expensive; it diverts
compensation from victims to the attorneys, witnesses and others in the
adversary system; it monopolizes court resources; worthy victims
cannot recover for their increased risk or injury because ofsubstantive
and procedural obstacles such as state statutes of limitations and
368
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evidentiary rules bearing on causation; there is a major disparity
between the award of damages associated with peculiarities of local law,
the talents or deficiencies of trial counsel, and the luck of the draw in
selecting a jury; there is a problem of delay, in which victims in
immediate need of financial help and medical assistance may wait for
years while technical issues of fault and responsibility are litigated in
the courts; and traditional common law tort compensation systems are
not equipped to decide cases involving claims of disease and increased
risk allegedly caused by exposure to hazardous substances which have
a latency period of decades.37 ' Another author, Wendy Wagner, has
proposed a change to the common law toxic tort system.372 However,
her change to the system would be impractical, and proves to be
academic.
Classic common law toxic tort causation has posed a
challenge to the civil justice system, and the response to date has been
inconsistent, inarticulate, and confused.
The Environmental
Compensation program would eliminate the problems of toxic tort
causation, by using an administrative panel of scientists, physicians,
economists and lawyers who would consider a broad range of evidence
on a case-by-case basis, distinguish clearly between the statistical
probability of the fact being proven, replacement of the fifty percent
probability of causation, and allowing discounting for recoveries to
reflect uncertainty. 373 This program will minimize uncertainty for the

risk-creator and the victim.
This program would make it easier and more efficient for
eligible victims to recover compensation swiftly, while simultaneously
placing limitations on the nature and amount of the recovery awarded.
There will be lower transaction costs in resolving disputes, and the
dollars presently spent to pay attorneys' fees, court costs, and other
expenses, would be spent compensating victims oftoxins. The primary
goal would be to develop this Environmental Compensation program
which would deal efficiently and effectively with future toxic tort
incidents.
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I know that this program modeled on existing Workers'
Compensation systems will be attacked as a political matter because of
the vested interest of both defense and plaintiff attorneys." 4 Riskcreators, in many instances, are large corporations and they pay massive
sums of money to attorneys in the defense oftoxic cases, and plaintiff
attorneys are waiting for the multi-million dollar toxic cases to come
their way. Just as the court stated in Stertz v. Industrial Insurance
Commission, "our act came of a great compromise ... Both had
suffered under the old system,. . . by heavy judgments of which half
'
was opposing lawyers' booty."375
Kenneth Feinberg, Special and
Settlement Master in the Agent Orange litigation, in his article The
Toxic Tort Litigation Crisis states that "many are asking whether the
common law tort system that, according to one study, siphons off at
least two-thirds of moneys paid by asbestos industry defendants before
they reach the plaintiff, serves any interest other than those of the trial
bar. 3 76 The study Kenneth Feinberg refers to is a 1984 Rand
Corporation study.
Over most of our common law history, the situations that gave
rise to tort liability took place on a very small scale. The actions tended
to occur at one single location, the gap in time between the defendant's
negligent action and plaintiffs injury was short, and the number of
individuals involved was very few. In toxic tort cases, this is no longer
the situation, and the activity may have occurred many years before a
lawsuit is brought. The place of injury may be far removed from the
location of the increased risk or injury, and the number of parties
involved in the litigation may be extremely large. The extremely hard
question is what measures allow the legal system to operate with
tolerable accuracy in the face of high administrative costs and the huge
evidentiary uncertainty that dominate toxic tort litigation. The aim of
our law should be to minimize administrative costs, reduce errors--that
is, holding someone liable for harm not done, or not holding someone
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liable for harm he or she did do-and to provide deterrence for activities
that do not advance society's needs.3 77
Nothing limits our power to change the common law toxic tort
system and create a system that functions in such a way as to maximize
benefits to society. The choice is one of policy. The cost of providing
compensation for toxic torts through the courts is too high when the cost
of the transaction and the amount received by the victim seeking
compensation are compared. Our present toxic tort system is too slow,
and its post hoc risk assessment does not advance society's overall needs
and inhibits socially useful action. Therefore, the critical issues are:
who should pay for some of the larger costs of living in an industrialtechnical society; how large awards should be; what standard of liability
should be applied; "and how much compensation should be
378
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Appendix A
Parent's Survey
Date:
Name

Automobile Liability Insurance

$

$

$

Home Owners' Liability Limit

$

If rent, Tenants' Liability Limit

$

Life Insurance
Mother

$

Father

$

Occupation
Mother
Father:

Age
Mother
Father
Parent's Telephone Number
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